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FINDING A SOLUTION FOR
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION: DID
THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
ACT FALL SHORT OF THE GOAL?
GEORGIANN OLIVER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Pregnancy-"the state of being with child".' For millions of work-
ing women pregnancy complicates the struggle for equality in the
workplace.2 Employers often exclude pregnancy-related benefits from
their otherwise comprehensive disability policies.3 This disparate
1. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1949 (2d ed. 1959).
2. There are approximately 47 million employed women in the labor force, of which
31 million are in the prime childbearing years of 20 to 44. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REP. No. 721, EMPLOYMENT IN PERSPECTIVE: WOMEN
IN THE LABOR FORCE (2d Quarter 1985).
3. Many policies reflect the traditional notion that women of childbearing age will
leave the workforce when they become pregnant. Therefore, employers often treat wo-
men as marginal workers and single them out for less favorable treatment. WOMEN'S
LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE IM-
PACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON FAMILIES AND WORK (1982). Even if employers do hire
or retain pregnant employees, the disability benefits employers provide often do not
include pregnancy benefits. See, eg., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)
(Supreme Court upheld General Electric's policy that women could not work on the
assembly line the last six months of pregnancy); In Re Southwestern Bell Tele. Co., 602
F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1979) (court rejected plaintiff's contention that the policy of refusing
to pay disability benefits to females leaving work for normal pregnancy and childbirth
violated Title VII). For a detailed historical view of pregnancy discrimination in the
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treatment compounds the pregnant worker's plight.4
Recognizing this differential treatment, Congress implemented the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA).5 Under the PDA, em-
ployers must treat pregnant employees the same for all employment
related purposes as nonpregnant employees similarly situated in ability
or inability to work.6 The PDA, however, fails to answer definitively
all questions concerning pregnancy discrimination.7 Furthermore, an
workplace see Erickson, Pregnancy Discrimination: An Analytical Approach, 7 Wo-
MEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER 11 (1981).
4. Not only must the pregnant employee deal with the physical and emotional
trauma of bearing a child, she must also worry about the possible loss of income and job
if her employer does not provide pregnancy-related disability benefits. An employer
who provides benefits for other nonoccupational disabilities discriminates against wo-
men who become disabled due to pregnancy. See infra notes 109, 111-19 (cases striking
down discriminatory pregnancy benefit policies).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964)). This section
provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical condi-
tions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 703(h) of this title shall
be interpreted to permit otherwise.
6. The Senate report explains that the same treatment principle provided by the
PDA is a restriction upon the employer's pregnancy related policy. The employer must
focus not on the condition of pregnancy alone, but on the actual effects of that condition
on the ability to work. Pregnant women who are able to work must be permitted to
work under the same conditions as other employees. S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1977). In introducing the bill, Senator Williams stated that the central purpose
was to require employers to treat women workers equally on the basis of ability or
inability to work. 123 CONG. REC. 29,385 (1977). One well-known authority on preg-
nancy discrimination notes that the legislative intent was to protect against discrimina-
tion on the basis of existing pregnancy and childbearing capacity. Williams, Firing the
Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment
Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 677 n.219 (1981).
7. The PDA left unanswered a multitude of questions. See, e.g., Newport News v.
EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983) (whether PDA requires employers to extend benefits to
dependents); EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984) (whether
attorneys who are shareholders in a professional corporation are "employers" for pur-
poses of the Civil Rights Act); Levin v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.
1984) (whether a business necessity defense can save a policy that discriminatorily
removes pregnant women from the workforce); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726
F.2d 1543 (1 Ith Cir. 1984) (elements of the plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination
under the PDA); National Educ. Assn. v. Garrahy, No. 83-04068 (D.R.I. Dec. 3, 1984)
(level of benefits to be provided for abortions); EEOC v. Group Hosp. Serv., Inc., 539 F.
Supp. 185 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (time when the Act takes effect).
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unresolved policy issue is whether the PDA's same treatment standard
is the proper solution to employment problems women face because of
their childbearing capabilities.'
Proponents of the PDA consider the same treatment standard an
equitable solution for pregnant and nonpregnant employees. They ar-
gue that employers must treat pregnant employees the same as other
employees who have disabilities preventing them from performing their
jobs.9 Opponents of the same treatment standard believe equality
comes not from the treatment itself, but from the effect the treatment
has on employment opportunities."0 Therefore, women need special
treatment for pregnancy-related disabilities to enjoy equal employment
opportunities."
Although the equal treatment and equal opportunity theories pro-
vide different solutions to the pregnancy discrimination problem, they
rest on similar foundations. Both find support in the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act's statutory language, 2 legislative history, 3 adminis-
8. The pregnancy discrimination issue triggered a bitter debate among legal schol-
ars. See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
9. See generally Williams, Reflection on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S
RIGHTS LAw REPORTER 175 (1982). Professor Wendy Williams is one of the leading
proponents of the equal treatment solution for pregnancy discrimination. She claims
that special treatment makes women more expensive employees, consequently increas-
ing the employer's incentive to discriminate against them. Id. at 196. She also claims
that special treatment increases the hostility among workers. Id. See also infra notes
74-83 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of Williams' view. For an over-
view of the pregnancy discrimination issue, including Williams' thoughts on the prob-
lem, see Lewin, Maternity Leave: Is It Leave, Indeed?, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1984, at
Fl, col. 2. San Francisco Mayor Dianne Feinstein also speaks in favor of the equal
treatment approach to pregnancy discrimination, claiming that the work market should
not have to accommodate a special group of women having children. Id. at F23, col. 2.
Richard E. Bradley, Vice-President of the Merchants and Manufacturers Association
believes that "discrimination for is as bad as discrimination against." Id. at F23, col. 1.
10 See generally Krieger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treat-
ment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REV 513 (1983). Linda Krieger, a staff attorney at the Employment Law Center in San
Francisco, proposes that women should receive special treatment to provide them real
equal opportunity in the workplace. Others support this theory. Maxine Waters, a
California assemblywoman, vowed to fight for special treatment legislation. L.A. Daily
J., April 4, 1984, at 4, col. I.
II The advocates of the equal opportunity approach believe equal treatment is not
sufficient to redress the economic and social disadvantages pregnant employees suffer.
See Krieger & Cooney, supra note 10. See also infra notes 141-63 and accompanying
text (detailing the equal opportunity theory).
12. The first section of the PDA is divided into two clauses. The first clause de-
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trative guidelines 4 and judicial interpretations. 5 To understand the
complexity of the issues pregnancy discrimination presents, and the so-
lutions proposed in response to the problem, it is helpful to examine
each theory and its foundational components. 6 Following a detailed
comparison of the two theories, this Note presents an evaluation of
congressional action and possible compromise solutions.7
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY
DISCRIMINATION ACT
A. Background: Pre-1978
Historically, the law treated women paternalistically, supplementing
the stereotypical view of women as marginal workers.' 8 By 1964, the
dlares that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination. This is a clarification of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1981), which provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
The PDA's second clause sets forth a standard of treatment for women in the work-
place: "Women affected by pregnancy shall be treated the same for all employment
related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work .. " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Courts often interpret the second clause
as a mandate for equal treatment. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text. For
one author's view on the proper construction of the PDA see Note, The 1978 Pregnancy
Discrimination Act: A Problem of Interpretation, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 607 (1980).
13. See infra notes 84-90, 164-81 and accompanying text (legislative history sup-
porting both the equal treatment and equal opportunity theories).
14. See infra notes 91-94, 182-88 and accompanying text (administrative guidelines
lending support to each of the two theories).
15. See infra notes 95-137, 189-212 and accompanying text (courts interpretations
supporting the equal treatment and equal opportunity theories).
16. See infra notes 67-140, 141-213 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 214-78 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). The Supreme Court upheld an
Oregon statute that limited the number of hours a woman could work each day. The
Court believed women were too weak and dependent to work the same hours as men.
Congressmen in the 1970's, however, aimed to rectify this historical characterization of
women. The House report on the PDA indicates that women are subject to the stereo-
type that all women are marginal workers. Employers view women of child-bearing age
as potential childbearers. Therefore, the congressmen reason, the elimination of dis-
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cry for equality spurred Congress to enact Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,19 which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis
of sex." Subsequently, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC)21 prepared guidelines interpreting Title VII.22 The
EEOC determined that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is dis-
crimination on the basis of sex.2 3
In accordance with the Civil Rights Act and the EEOC's interpreta-
tion, courts struck down employer policies treating pregnant employ-
ees unfavorably." In 1976, however, the Supreme Court addressed
crimination based on pregnancy increasingly will provide equal opportunity. H.R. REP.
No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 6-7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4749, 4754-55.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1981). For an overview of the legal community's atti-
tude toward sex discrimination preceding the enactment of Title VII, see L.F. GOLD-
STEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1979). For a general discussion of
the legislative history of sex-based discrimination, see Miller, Sex Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REv. 877, 879-85 (1967).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. See supra note 12. Representatives added the sex discrim-
ination provision in an attempt to defeat the bill. The attempt failed and the bill passed
in both houses. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Smith who of-
fered the amendment, and remarks of others such as Rep. Cellar who opposed the mea-
sure), Id. at 2584 (remarks of Rep. Green citing absence of reports and legislative
hearings as signs of uncommendable manipulation).
21. Congress charged the EEOC with the administration of Title VII. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (1981). For an overview of the EEOC's role in implementing Title VII's sex
discrimination policy, see Comment, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 and the
EEOC Guidelines: A Return to "Great Deference?', 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 735 (1980).
Generally, courts afford the guidelines great deference, but there are exceptions. In
General Elec. Co. v, Gilbert, the Supreme Court noted that there are times when the
courts would not feel compelled to follow the guidelines. 429 U.S. 125, 140-45 (1976).
22. The EEOC's Guidelines on Sex Discrimination have not been changed since
their formulation in 1978. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1985).
23. The guidelines explicitly state that discrimination based on pregnancy is a prima
facie violation of the sex discrimination provision of Title VII. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10
(1985). Section 1604.10(a) of the guidelines provides that "[a] written or unwritten
employment policy or practice which excludes from employment applicants or employ-
ees because of pregnancy, childbirth, or other related medical conditions is a prima facie
violation of Title VII." See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1985), which provides that
"[d]isabilities caused ... by pregnancy . . . for all job related purposes, shall be treated
the same as disabilities caused . . . by other medical conditions, under any health or
disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment ......
See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (1985), which provides that "[w]here the termination of
an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by an employment policy under
which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termination violates the Act if it has a
disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by business necessity."
24. All federal circuit courts that addressed pregnancy discrimination before 1976
1986]
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pregnancy discrimination under Title VII,25 and held that discrimina-
tion based on pregnancy was not discrimination based on sex.2 6 In
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,27 the Court upheld General Electric's
insurance plan, which excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from
coverage.28 Disregarding lower court decisions29 and EEOC guide-
lines,3° Justice Rehnquist concluded that disparity of treatment be-
tween pregnancy-related disabilities and other disabilities did not
constitute sex discrimination.31 The exclusion of pregnancy from the
list of covered disabilities was condition-related, not gender-related,
and was therefore valid.3 2
Subsequently, in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,33 the Court again upheld
a policy denying sick leave benefits to pregnant women.3 4 The Court,
held that pregnancy discrimination was sex discrimination under Title VII. See, e.g.,
Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975) (Title VII prohibits exclusion
of pregnancy-related disabilities from company employee disability benefit program);
Communications Workers v. A.T.&T., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975) (disparity of treat-
ment between pregnancy-related and other disabilities in the employment context vio-
lates Title VII); Farkas v. Southwestern City School Dist., 506 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir.
1974) (failure to pay teachers sick leave for absences related to pregnancy constitutes
discrimination on the basis of sex). When considering the PDA, Congress noted that
these decisions reflected the original intent of Title VII. See H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749.
25. The Supreme Court had previously considered pregnancy discrimination in the
face of constitutional challenges. In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974), the Court held that school board policies requiring pregnant teachers to take
maternity leave four months before the expected delivery date violated the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, although a flexible leave policy would not. Id. at 651.
In Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) the Court found that exclusion of benefits for
normal pregnancy from a disability plan did not violate the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause.
26. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 129.
29. See supra note 24.
30. See supra note 23. Justice Rehnquist refused to defer to guidelines which the
EEOC formulated eight years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He
claimed they did not have the force of law. 429 U.S. at 140-46.
31. 429 U.S. at 136.
32. Id. at 139. Justice Rehnquist concluded that pregnancy related disabilities
"constitute an additional risk, unique to women and failure to compensate for them
does not destroy the presumed party of the benefits, accruing to men and women alike,
which result from facially evenhanded inclusion of risks." Id. (emphasis in original).
33. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
34. Id. at 143-46.
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however, struck down a companion policy denying accrued seniority to
women on maternity leave." The Court found the seniority and medi-
cal benefit policies distinguishable. Depriving women of seniority ben-
efits was not merely "a refusal to extend women a benefit men cannot
receive, but imposed on a woman a substantial burden she need not
suffer." 3 6
As a result of these decisions,3 7 an employer could single out preg-
nancy-related benefits for unfavorable treatment so long as such treat-
ment did not otherwise deprive female employees of employment
opportunities.38 Congress' failure to include pregnancy discrimination
in the definition of sex discrimination, as well as the Supreme Court's
determination that pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimina-
tion, left those dealing with charges of pregnancy discrimination un-
sure of the proper legal path to follow.3 9
B. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Congress acted immediately to clarify the state of confusion sur-
rounding the pregnancy discrimination issue. The legislators amended
35. Id. at 139-42. The Supreme Court apparently wavered from the hard stance it
took in Gilbert. The Court struck down a portion of the company's policy that denied
employees returning from pregnancy leave their accumulated seniority. Id. at 141. The
Court even looked to EEOC guidelines in making the decision. Id. at 142 n.4.
36. Id. at 142.
37. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 128 and Satty, 434 U.S. at 136. See also Wald, Judicial
Construction of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title V1: Ignoring
Congressional Intent, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 591 (1982) (traces the pregnancy discrimina-
tion issue through the passage of the PDA).
38. After Gilbert, some lower courts upheld the exclusion of pregnancy benefits
from disability plans. See, e.g., Eberts v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 581 F.2d 357 (3d
Cir. 1978) (the company's disability insurance policy, which paid male employees non-
occupational sickness benefits, but denied benefits to women absent from work because
of pregnancy, did not unlawfully discriminate against pregnant employees). Courts,
however, did not always follow the Gilbert rationale. Compare Mitchell v. Board of
Trustees, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 338 (D.S.C. 1977) with Jacobs v. Martin
Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir. 1977).
39. See, e.g., DeLauier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.
1978) (ninth month mandatory pregnancy leave for teachers does not violate the four-
teenth amendment, but denial of sick days for maternity leave violates Title VII). Some
lower courts, looking to the safety of third persons, sustained pregnancy-related policies
which limited the activities of pregnant employees. See In re National Airlines, 434 F.
Supp. 249 (D. Fla. 1977) (although the question of fetal health is immaterial, maternity
leave that required a stewardess to leave her job upon discovery of pregnancy is a viola-
tion of Title VII, while mandatory leave in the twentieth week is not a violation because
the policy protects passengers).
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Title VII by adding the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
(PDA).' Overruling the Supreme Court's interpretation of sex dis-
crimination,4 Congress declared that discrimination based on preg-
nancy, childbirth or related medical conditions is discrimination based
on sex.4 2 To guarantee working women protection from disparate
treatment, Congress added a substantive provision to the statute.
"Women affected by pregnancy ... shall be treated the same ... as
others not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work."43
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981). On March 15, 1977, Sen. Williams introduced S.
995 and Rep. Hawkins introduced H.R. 5055, which was reintroduced as H.R. 6075.
The Senate Subcommittee on Labor reported S. 995 to the full Committee on Re-
sources, which amended the bill to add an effective date and to provide for adjustment
of existing benefit plans. The Senate passed S. 995 on September 16, 1977. The House
Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities reported H.R. 6075 to the full Committee
on Education and Labor, which amended the bill to provide for the exemption of abor-
tion from fringe benefits. The House passed H.R. 6075 on July 18, 1978. Subsequently,
the House Committee of Conference met to consider S. 995 and to issue a report. The
Senate agreed to the abortion amendment and passed S. 995 on October 13, 1978. The
House approved the bill on October 15, 1978. See H. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749; H.R. CoNF. REP. No.
1786, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4765; S.
REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The Senate report clarified the purpose of
the bill: "This bill is intended to make plain that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions
is discrimination based on sex." Id. at 3. For the text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981),
see supra note 5.
41. The Supreme Court in Gilbert had held that discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy was not discrimination on the basis of sex. See supra notes 25-32 and accompa-
nying text.
42. See Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The Di-
lemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66
IOWA L. REV. 63, 79 (1980). At least one congressman noted that disagreement with
Gilbert was the inspiration for the legislation. See 123 CONG. REC. 29,387 (remarks of
Sen. Javits).
43. The Senate report explains that the purpose of the PDA is to change the defini-
tion of sex discrimination in Title VII to reflect this "common sense" view and to pro-
tect working women against all forms of employment discrimination. S. REP. No. 331,
supra note 40, at 3. The House report points out the confusion created by the Gilbert
and Satty decisions:
H.R. 6075 was introduced to change the definition of sex discrimination in Title
VII to reflect the common sense view and to ensure that working women are pro-
tected in all forms of discrimination based on sex. By making clear that distinc-
tions based on pregnancy areperse violations of Title VII, the bill would eliminate
the need in most instances to rely on the impact approach, and thus would obviate
the difficulties in applying the distinctions created in Sally.
H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 40, at 3. The House also reaffirmed the idea of equal
treatment in all aspects of employment: "H.R. 6075 unmistakably reaffirms that sex
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The PDA provided an immediate solution to the situation Congress
attempted to rectify.' Although there is evidence that Congress rec-
ognized the pregnant worker's unique situation,4 5 because Congress
was working in reaction to the Supreme Court's Gilbert decision,46 it
chose only to impose an equal treatment standard upon employers;4 7
Congress wanted to countermand the Supreme Court's Gilbert deci-
sion.4" Throughout the debates,4 9 hearings5 ° and reports, 5 1 congress-
discrimination includes pregnancy discrimination, and specifically defines standards
which require that pregnant workers be treated the same as other employees on the
basis of ability to work." H.R. REP,. No. 948, supra note 40, at 3. See also H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 1786, supra note 40, at 3.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Beyond merely redefining the term "sex," Congress im-
plemented the Act to guarantee working women protection against differential treat-
ment by setting out a specific standard for employers to follow. The statute mandates
"same treatment" for all employees. Id. Senator Williams remarked: "The central
purpose of the bill is to require that women workers be treated equally with other em-
ployees on the basis of their ability or inability to work .... In this way the law will
protect women from the full range of discriminatory practices which have adversely
affected their status in the workforce." 123 CONG. REc. 29,385 (1977) (remarks of Sen.
Williams). Congress intended for this Act to apply to all aspects of employment-
hiring, reinstatement, termination, disability benefits, sick leave, medical benefits, sen-
iority and other conditions covered by Title VII. See H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 40,
at 4.
45. The blunt statutory language of the PDA masks much of Congress' decision-
making process. Cost to the employer, abortion benefits, impact on the family, women
as marginal workers, and effects of childbearing are among the topics the legislators
discussed in reaching their decision. See, e.g., 124 CONG. Rtc. 21,435-42 (1978). See
infra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
46. For example, the Senate report notes: "The bill defines sex discrimination, as
proscribed in the existing statute, to include these physiological occurrences peculiar to
women ...." S. REP. No. 331, supra note 40, at 4.
47. "The touchstone of compliance with S. 995 is equality of treatment . 123
CONG. REc. 29,645 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Stafford).
48. 429 U.S. 125. The Supreme Court handed down the Gilbert and Satty decisions,
upholding policies unfavorable to pregnant employees, less than one year before con-
gressmen introduced the pregnancy discrimination bills. Congress worked from the
viewpoint that pregnant women received fewer disability benefits than other employees
similarly disabled. Thus, their immediate goal was to raise the level of benefits for preg-
nancy disabilities up to the level given for other nonoccupational disabilities. See S.
REP. No. 331, note 40, at 2.
49. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 29,660 (1977). Senator Javits explained that the Act
simply meant that if coverage or benefits are given, employers must treat pregnancy the
same as other nonwork related disabilities. Id. at 29,387.
50. See, e.g., Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearing on H.R. 5055 and
H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 287 (1977).
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men imposed an obligation on employers to accommodate for
pregnancy-related disabilities with regard to the employee's ability to
perform the job.52 To allay fears of those who believed the Act would
unduly burden employers, proponents announced that only those em-
ployers providing benefits for other nonoccupational disabilities must
extend the same level of benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities. 3
The Act prohibits discriminatory treatment but does not require em-
ployers to treat pregnant employees in any particular manner. They
must only treat pregnant employees in the same manner as they treat
other employees similarly disabled. 4
Despite the unambiguous statutory language and the multiple refer-
ences to equal treatment,55 specific references to equal opportunity are
also scattered throughout the legislative history.5 6 Congress recog-
nized indirectly the pregnant worker's special needs. For example,
Congress endorsed the Gilbert dissent, which specifically noted that the
capacity to become pregnant distinguishes the sexes.57 Also, in exam-
ining statistics of frequency and longevity of pregnancy-related disabili-
ties, Congress acknowledged the impact of childbearing upon
51. See, eg., S. REP. No. 331, supra note 40, at 4. See also H.R. REP. No. 948,
supra notes 40, 43.
52. The Senate report states as follows: "The bill prohibits only discriminatory
treatment. Therefore, the bill does not require employers to treat pregnant women in
any particular manner .... The bill would simply require that pregnant women be
treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work." S.
REP. No. 331, supra note 40, at 4.
53. See 123 CONG. REc. 29,663 (1977) (the bill makes it clear that an employer
must provide benefits on an equal basis if he provides benefits at all because the bill does
not require an employer to do anything more for his pregnant employees than he does
for any other employee) (remarks of Sen. Mathias).
54. See S. REP. No. 331, supra note 40, at 4. Congress restricted the benefits given
to a pregnant woman to compensate for time lost while medically unable to work. 123
CONG. REc. 29,662 (1977). Congress compared pregnancy to other voluntary disabili-
ties, such as hair transplants and vasectomies. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 26,941, 29,661
(1977).
55. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REc. 29,663 (1977) (noting that the Act is vital to the equal
employment opportunity of all women in this country) (remarks of Sen. Mathias); see
also 124 CONG. REc. 21,437 (1978) (legislation which requires that pregnant women be
treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work will
help provide equal employment opportunities for millions of women) (remarks of Rep.
Green).
57. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REc. 29,641 (1977) (quoting Justice Steven's dissent in
Gilbert, which states that pregnancy is the characteristic that differentiates men and
women) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
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employment opportunities." In addition, legislators showed concern
not only for the pregnant employees but also for their families.59
Although Congress was working to remedy the immediate shortcom-
ings of pregnancy-discrimination policies," it was aware that the
unique position of pregnant employees might require a special stan-
dard. Nonetheless, Congress failed to accommodate for the disparate
impact an equal opportunity theory could avoid.6"
58. Figures cited indicate that about 85% of all working women become pregnant
at some time during their working lives. 123 CONG. REc. 29,388 (1978). Seventy per-
cent of female employees work out of necessity, and 40% are employed during preg-
nancy. Id at 29,386. The average leave time for a pregnant woman is six to eight
weeks. Id. at 29,642.
Congress, however, failed to compare the problems caused by pregnancy to other
types of disabilities, except disabilities such as broken arms. If the legislators had ex-
amined the impact of these other "shared" disabilities upon the ability to work, they
may have arrived at a different conclusion about the equal treatment approach. They
did recognize the side-effects of pregnancy itself, such as miscarriage and toxemia,
which a man would not experience. Id. at 29,641.
59. One Senator pointed out that not only women, but their families as well, often
bear the burdens that can accompany pregnancy:
Without this legislation, they may face a series of obstacles to continuing the preg-
nancy to term while maintaining their jobs and their incomes. Many women tem-
porarily disabled by pregnancy have been forced to take leave without pay or to
resign. In so doing, they have forfeited the income which holds their families to-
gether, which helps assure their children adequate nutrition and health care, and
which helps keep their families from resorting to welfare. Faced with the dual cost
of being forced to pay their medical costs plus losing their wages, many low-income
women have felt that only one alternative remained--even unwanted abortion.
Where other employees who face temporary periods of disability do not have to
face the same loss, it is especially important that we not ask a potential mother to
undergo severe disadvantages in order to bring another life into the world. I would
hope that we all can see the injustice that has occurred and that continues to occur
without this bill.
123 CONG. REC. 29,387 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
60. Congress was working to remedy the Gilbert situation. See 123 CONG. REC.
29,661 (1977). Sen. Cranston cited the General Electric plan that gave all employees a
disability plan paying weekly nonoccupational sickness benefits, excluding pregnancy,
as typical of the practices of companies at that time. Id.
61. The PDA was important because "a large number of working women need its
protection for their financial security and the security of their families." 123 CONG.
REC. 29,385 (remarks of Sen. Williams) (emphasis added). Sen. Williams remarked
that 2/3 of female employees work because of economic need and that the median earn-
ings of women who work is 40% less than the median of male employees. Id. These
remarks indicate that Congress realized the exclusion of pregnancy benefits imposed a
dual burden upon women. Thus, they acted to remove the burdens related to employ-
ment. Many find the PDA's solution to pregnancy discrimination in employment un-
satisfactory. See infra notes 141-63 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of
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To complement the PDA, the EEOC reissued pregnancy discrimina-
tion guidelines 62 and added a series of thirty-seven "Questions and An-
swers on Pregnancy Discrimination" 63  which embody the same
treatment standard. 64 At one point, however, the guidelines vary from
the strict equal treatment standard. They require an employer to pro-
vide "adequate" leave to pregnant employees unless excused for reason
of business necessity.65 Therefore, the EEOC recognized pregnancy's
impact on employment opportunity and accordingly acted to alleviate
the disparity.
Thus, the legislative history and the administrative guidelines favor
the equal treatment policy. Yet, both acknowledge the exceptional sit-
uation pregnancy presents and hint that special treatment is necessary
for women to attain equal employment opportunities. This double
standard forms the basis of two major theories, each claiming to be the
the merits of the equal opportunity theory, an alternative to the PDA's equal treatment
standard.
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1985). The EEOC had developed guidelines interpreting
the sex discrimination portion of the Civil Rights Act. The guidelines explicitly state
that discrimination based on pregnancy is a prima facie violation of the sex discrimina-
tion provision of the Civil Rights Act. The courts historically have given great defer-
ence to the EEOC guidelines. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971),
in which Chief Justice Burger wrote that the EEOC guidelines are entitled to great
deference as they express Congressional will. But see General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 140-45 (1976), in which the Supreme Court refused to give the guidelines
deference. See generally Comment, supra note 21, at 746-49 (historical account ofjudi-
cial treatment of EEOC regulations).
63. See Questions and Answers on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.10 (App. 1985), in which the EEOC formulated questions and answers to ad-
dress the confusing aspects of the Act. The questions and answers address, inter alia,
date of effect, terminations, leaves of absence, benefits, ability to perform, insurance and
disability plans.
Also, pursuant to the passage of the Act, the EEOC and the Department of Labor
formulated Proposed Interpretive Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Re-
productive Hazards, 45 Fed. Reg. 7516 (1980), withdrawn, 46 Fed. Reg. 3916 (1981)
that suggested tests for pregnancy-based discrimination cases and evaluated policy rules
for employers to follow. The agencies withdrew these guidelines because they decided
that case-by-case enforcement of the guidelines was a more appropriate method to fol-
low. 46 Fed. Reg. 3916 (1981).
64. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1985); see also supra notes 22-23.
65. "Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused
by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termi-
nation violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not
justified by business necessity." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (1985).
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correct solution to pregnancy discrimination.6 6
III. THE CORRECT SOLUTION: EQUAL TREATMENT
OR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY?
As one legal scholar notes, "equality can be seen as an individual
right to equal treatment or as a social policy promoting equality of
effect.", 67 The pregnancy discrimination debate rages between two dis-
tinct groups. Proponents of an equal treatment policy for pregnancy-
disabled employees see equality in treatment as the major concern.68
Advocates of preferential treatment for pregnant employees focus on
equality in result.69 Although radically different in rationale and prac-
tice, both the equal treatment and equal opportunity theories look to
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's language,7° legislative history,7 1
administrative guidelines72 and judicial interpretations7 3 for support.
A. Equal Treatment Theory
1. The Theory
The equal treatment theory embodies the same treatment standard
the PDA imposes to remedy disparate treatment.74 Under this theory,
66. See infra notes 74-84, 141-63 and accompanying text for a review of the equal
treatment and equal opportunity theories.
67. Krieger & Cooney, supra note 10, at 554.
68. See infra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 141-63 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 84-85, 164-67 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 86-90, 168-81 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 91-94, 182-88 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 96-137, 189-212 and accompanying text.
74. Equal treatment theorists argue that a policy of disparate treatment based on
pregnancy is discriminatory on its face. The employer's only defense to such a charge is
that the policy constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). The em-
ployer's BFOQ claim admits discrimination and attempts to justify it by claiming that
the position requires possession of a unique characteristic for successful job perform-
ance. The employer must be able to prove that the distinguishing characteristic of the
disfavored class members prevents them from performing their duties safely and effi-
ciently. "If the employer succeeds in establishing that the discriminatory policy is a
BFOQ exception, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the employer's
justification is merely pretext for discrimination." Note, The Pregnant Employee's Ap-
pearance as a BFOQ Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 14 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 195,
213-14 (1982). The author notes that although the PDA redefined sex discrimination to
include pregnancy discrimination, Congress carved out an express exception to Title
VII's prohibition against sex discrimination:
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differential treatment for any employment-related purpose can be justi-
fied only by differences in the ability to work, not by differences in the
conditions that cause the inability." The employer can treat the preg-
nant employee neither better nor worse than nonpregnant disabled co-
workers, because in the workplace all disabilities may impede the
ability to work.7
6
This theory emphasizes the similarities between the sexes, minimiz-
ing the significance of gender reproductive differences.77 The emphasis
on the similarities of the rights and needs of both sexes encourages
employers to treat all employees the same.78 Treating women the same
as men ultimately will allow women to gain equality through competi-
tion in the workplace.79
The BFOQ defense allows employers to justify dissimilar treatment toward preg-
nant employees and to discriminate openly on the basis of sex without violating
Title VII .... The BFOQ exception to Title VII's general mandate of equal oppor-
tunity in employment for all allows employers to discharge or demand leave of
absence from visibly pregnant women when the dominant aspect of the employee's
job and essence of the employer's business are to provide vicarious or "attenuated"
sex.
Id. at 226-27. The author advocates removing pregnancy discrimination from the statu-
tory exception. Id.
75. One author labels this view the "liberal model of equality." This model's adher-
ents believe in a strict equal treatment theory. See Krieger & Cooney, supra note 10, at
537 (the authors examine the theory, although they do not advocate it). Herma Hill
Kay labels this model the "assimilationist" model because it implies that the law should
treat women and men as if they are interchangeable. Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U.
ILL. L.F. 39, 40. Other theorists have developed their own models of equality. Eliza-
beth Wolgast proposes the "bivalent model." She asserts that the differences between
men and woman are substantial and sexual equality will result only if society deals with
sex differences by developing special rights which lead to equality of result. E. WOL-
GAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1980). Professor Ann Scales advo-
cates an "incorporationist" approach. In this model women have rights different from
men only with respect to sex-specific conditions that are completely unique to women.
Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375 (1980-81).
76. See Williams, supra note 9, at 193.
77. This theory assumes that there are no differences between the sexes that cannot
be dismissed as illusory sex-stereotypes, or which cannot be effectively compared to and
treated the same as cross-sex analogous conditions. See Krieger & Cooney, supra note
10, at 538.
78. Id. The authors note that the liberal model of sexual equality is based upon two
fundamental assumptions. The first is "that there are no differences between the sexes
which cannot be dismissed as illusory sex-stereotypes," and the second is that "once all
vestiges of disparate treatment are removed, men and women will achieve equal status
through freedom of choice and equal competition in the social and economic market-
place." Id.
79. Id. Proponents of the equal treatment theory believe women will benefit from
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The equal treatment theory attempts to avert dangers its proponents
believe are inherent in special treatment statutes. First, they argue, the
special treatment statutes treat women in ways that historically have
harmed them.8" Second, if an employer focuses on one class, the em-
ployer engenders feelings that it no longer cares for all employees.81
Third, employers may avoid hiring women of childbearing age to avoid
the obligations of preferential statutes.82 Last, the statutes allow judges
to infuse their own values in the decisionmaking process. 83  Equal
treatment advocates argue that the PDA avoids many of these stere-
otypical dangers and generates equality as it eliminates sexist distinc-
tions based on pregnancy."
2. The Legislative and Administrative Basis
Both the PDA's statutory language and legislative history support
the equal treatment theory. The Act specifically requires employers to
treat pregnant workers the "same" as other persons similarly situated
in ability to perform the job.85 This black-letter rule embodies a basic
tenet of the equal treatment theory, affording advocates a strong argu-
ment that state laws and employer policies should neither bestow more
nor provide fewer benefits on pregnant employees than upon compara-
policies that insist on adequate medical coverage for all workers. Williams, supra note
9, at 196. Isabelle Katz Pinzler, a women's rights attorney for the ACLU, stated that
the organization was fighting for national legislation guaranteeing temporary disability
leave for all workers. N.Y. Times, July 22, 1984, at F23, col. 3.
80. See generally Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977- Hearings on S.
995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1977) (distinctions based on pregnancy tend to perpetuate the
stereotype of a woman as a childbearer rather than wage-earner). Id. at 307. Bella
Abzug, Presiding Officer, National Commission on the Observance of International
Women's Year, testifying in support of the bill stated: "[D]ramatic illustration of eco-
nomic need can be seen in the growing percentage of families headed by women who
can ill afford disruption in their earnings for themselves and their children." Id. at 309.
Abzug noted that at the time of consideration of the bill about 40% of working women
whose employers had disability plans were not covered for pregnancy related
disabilities.
81. See Taub, BoOK REVIEW, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1686 (1980).
82. Williams, supra note 9, at 196. Title VII does not permit such practices, but
proof of employer motivation is difficult to establish. Id. at 196 n. 115.
83. Id. at 196. Equal opportunity advocates deny the proposition that preferential
treatment inordinately encourages judges to impose personal bias upon decisions. Krie-
ger & Cooney, supra note 10, at n.92.
84. Williams, supra note 9, at 197-98.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). See supra note 5.
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bly disabled coworkers.8 6
Coupling the Act's unambiuous language with its legislative history
reinforces the argument for equal treatment. The legislative history is
replete with congressional pronouncements of the theory. 7 Assur-
ances that no employer must provide any benefits to pregnant workers
beyond those he provides other disabled employees are scattered
throughout the record. 8 In addition, Congress specifically addressed
those fears that had prompted the development of the equal treatment
theory.89 Congress noted that employers no longer may view women
as marginal workers merely because of their childbearing capacity.90
Possibly as important as the favorable comments Congress made on
the equal treatment theory is the absence of specific suggestions that
pregnant women should enjoy preferential treatment.91 This omission
supports the interpretation that although Congress disapproved of re-
duced pregnancy benefits, they did not necessarily believe that preg-
nancy discrimination problems called for preferential treatment.
86. See generally Williams, supra note 9.
87. For example, Sen. Williams remarked that "[t]he key to compliance in every
case will be equality of treatment." 123 CONG. REc. 29,385 (1977).
88. Sen. Javits noted that the PDA does not require employers to provide any spe-
cific benefits to pregnant employees: "The bill adopts as its standard equality of treat-
ment, and thereby permits the personal and fringe benefit programs already in existence
for other similar conditions to be the measure of an employer's duty toward pregnant
employees." 123 CONG. REc. 29,387 (1977) (emphasis added).
89. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. Congress specifically intended to
arrest the stereotypical attitude employers had toward pregnant workers. The Senate
report notes that "the assumption that women will become pregnant and leave the labor
market is at the core of sex stereotyping resulting in unfavorable disparate treatment of
women in the workplace. A failure to address discrimination based on pregnancy...
would prevent the elimination of sex discrimination in employment." S. REP. No. 331,
supra note 40 at 3. Senator Brooke rejected the notion that the PDA would grant preg-
nant workers special benefits: "S. 995 in no way provides special disability benefits for
working women. They have not demanded, nor asked for such benefits. They have
asked only to be treated with fairness, to be accorded the same employment rights as
men." 123 CONG. REc. 29,664 (1977).
90. Women are often seen as marginal workers. Employers often refused women
certain jobs and training because of concern that they would leave the employer's serv-
ices. Congress enacted the PDA to close these gaps and protect women from the full
range of discriminatory practices adversely affecting their status in the workforce. See
123 CONG. REC. 29,385-88 (1977).
91. Congress did not directly endorse preferential treatment of pregnant women,
although they did note some state laws that provide special treatment for pregnant
workers. They also referred to state statutes that require equal treatment similar to the
PDA. See H. REP. No. 948, supra note 40, at 4759.
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Therefore, Congress concluded that uniform disability policies more
satisfactorily resolved the equality debate.
Administrative implementation of the PDA reaffirmed the equal
treatment view.9 2 In the guidelines93 and appendix,94 the EEOC inter-
preted the Act as mandating "same treatment." For example, the
guidelines state that an employer must hold a job open for women ab-
sent because of pregnancy according to the same criteria that jobs are
held open for employees on leave for other nonoccupational disabili-
ties.95 The EEOC repeats this theme throughout the regulations. Con-
sequently, the equal treatment theory stands on solid legislative and
administrative grounds.
3. Judicial Support for Equal Treatment
Currently, the battleground for the equal treatment and equal oppor-
tunity theories is the courtroom. Since 1978, the courts have narrowed
their approach to pregnancy discrimination,96 relying heavily on the
92. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
93. One EEOC guideline states that disabilities caused or contributed to by preg-
nancy shall be treated the same as medical disabilities with regard to such matters as
leave, seniority, reinstatement and insurance. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1985). But see
29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (1985) which deviates from the "same" treatment standard en-
trenched in other guidelines. It provides:
Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by
an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a ter-
mination violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is
not justified by business necessity.
94. See Questions and Answers on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604 (App. 1985). The interpretive guideline which states that a health insurance
plan which currently provides extended benefits for other medical conditions on a less
favorable basis than for pregnancy-related medical conditions, must provide extended
benefits for other medical conditions on the same basis as for those pregnancy-related
conditions. In Kansas Ass'n of Commerce & Indus. v. EEOC, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 588 (D. Kan. 1983), a district court specifically endorsed the guideline. The
court found that a plan extending greater benefits to women than men violated Title
VII's ban on sex discrimination. Id.
95. Question 9 states:
Q. Must an employer hold open the job of an employee who is absent on leave
because she is temporarily disabled by pregnancy related conditions?
A. Unless the employee on leave has informed the employer that she does not
intend to return to work, her job must be held open for her on the same basis
as jobs are held open for employees on sick or disability leave for other
reasons.
Questions and Answers on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (App.
1985).
96. See infra notes 108-37 for cases that apply the same treatment test to particular
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PDA's same treatment standard.97 Many courts utilize the equal treat-
ment theory to determine the propriety of the standard98 and its appli-
cation to specific disability policies.99
The Supreme Court's pronouncements on the pregnancy discrimina-
tion issue further buttress the position of equal treatment theorists.' °°
In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. vs. EEOC,'0 ' the
Supreme Court determined that an insurance plan that limited cover-
age for pregnancy-related expenses incurred by spouses of male em-
ployees violated Title VII by discriminating against male employees. 102
employer practices. This straight forward application of the test contrasts the detailed
disparate treatment and impact analysis courts often applied to the same employment
policy prior to the PDA. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Harris
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). See supra note 5 for text.
98. See infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 110-37 and accompanying text.
100. Although the Supreme Court, since the passage of the PDA, has not ruled on a
case in which an employer discriminated directly against a pregnant employee, the
Court did address the propriety of the PDA in a case which struck down a policy
discriminating against male employees. See Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock
Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
101. 462 U.S. 669 (1983). See Comment, Interpretation of the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act and the EEOC Guidelines: Conflicting Federal Responses and Analogous
Confusion at the State Level, 1 DET. C.L. REv. 77 (1984). The author analyzes the
Newport News decision and tracks its progress from the lower courts. The author also
examines the use of the BFOQ and business necessity defenses under the PDA.
102. 462 U.S. at 685. The Court stated that the issue was "whether petitioner has
discriminated against its male employees with respect to their compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of their sex within the meaning of
§ 703(a)(1) of Title VII." Id. at 675. The Court determined that the company's plan
was unlawful because the protection it gave married male employees was less compre-
hensive than the protection it gave married female employees. Id. at 676. Specifically,
the Court found that the company's plan violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). See supra
note 12 for text. The Court noted that although the PDA makes clear that the language
of 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2(a) should be constructed to prohibit discrimination against fe-
male employees on the basis of pregnancy, it did not remove or limit Title VII's prohibi-
tion of discrimination on the basis of the employee's sex-male or female-already
present in the employment discrimination statute. 462 U.S. at 675 n.11.
The Court discussed the legislative history of the PDA and noted that proponents of
the legislation always intended to protect all individuals from sex discrimination in em-
ployment, including, but not limited to, pregnant workers. Id. at 681.
The Court went on to state that the company's practice was unlawful because it did
not pass the test of Title VII that the Court had formulated in Los Angeles Dept. of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978). Under the test as expressed in
Manhart, a policy must not treat a class of employees in a certain manner solely on the
basis of gender. Id.
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The Court required the employer to extend the same level of medical
coverage for all conditions, including pregnancy, to spouses of employ-
ees of both sexes. 10 3 Consequently, equal treatment advocates can ar-
gue that the Supreme Court does not interpret the PDA as requiring
greater benefits for females, but equal benefits for all employees." °
The judicial battle between the theories is highlighted in cases that
determine the propriety of state legislation extending preferential treat-
ment to pregnant employees. The inconsistent decisions amplify the
debate because both sides claim judicial victory for their competing
positions.105 To support their theory, equal treatment proponents rely
on cases such as a California district court's recent decision in Califor-
nia Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra.10 6  The court
struck down a state law requiring employers to offer pregnant women
103. 462 U.S. at 685. The Court stated, "[i]n short, Congress' rejection of the prem-
ises of General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert forecloses any claim that an insurance program ex-
cluding pregnancy coverage for female beneficiaries and providing complete coverage to
similarly situated male beneficiaries does not discriminate on the basis of sex." There-
fore, because the Newport Company's plan mirrored G.E.'s plan, see supra notes 24-32,
Newport News Dry Dock Co. was guilty of discrimination.
104. Newport News bolsters the equal treatment theory. The Court's discussion of
the PDA's legislative history and its acceptance of the PDA's definition of sex discrimi-
nation and the same treatment standard lend credence to the theory. The Court's deci-
sion is significant because it determines that men can also suffer from pregnancy
discrimination. Equality in treatment runs to both female and male employees. Never-
theless, those advocating equal opportunity may argue that the interpretation of the
PDA is not yet a settled issue. In Newport News, the Court did not examine a policy
that provided special pregnancy benefits to either male or female employees. The
Court, however, noted that the cost of providing complete insurance coverage for de-
pendents of male employees may exceed the cost of providing complete coverage for
dependents of female employees. 462 U.S. at 685 n.26. The Court decided that this
type of cost differential was not a defense under Title VII once discrimination was
shown. Id. The Court's indirect approval of unequal treatment bolsters a special treat-
ment theorist's argument. See also California Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390
(9th Cir. 1985), infra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 105-37 and accompanying text (cases applying the equal treat-
ment theory); infra notes 189-212 and accompanying text (cases applying the equal op-
portunity theory).
106. 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 562 (C.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 758 F.2d 390 (9th
Cir. 1985). When Lillian Garland attempted to return to her job from maternity leave,
she found her position filled. The California Department of Fair Employment and
Housing told her that the bank had violated a state law that provided four months of
unpaid pregnancy leave without loss of job. The bank's disability plan allowed the bank
to terminate an employee on leave of absence if a similar position is not available when
the employee returns to work. Id. at 565. The district court held that the California
law was null and void due to its conflict with the mandate of the same treatment stan-
dard under the PDA. Id. at 568.
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up to four months maternity leave and to ensure the women reinstate-
ment upon return.10 7 The court, agreeing with the employer,"0 8 found
the law inconsistent with PDA's purposes of eliminating gender-based
classifications and providing equal treatment to all employees.' 09 The
court rejected the suggestion that the statutes could co-exist and de-
clared the California statute invalid." 0
Courts determining the validity of specific benefit plans routinely
hold that the employer must provide the "same" treatment for all non-
occupational disabilities. The courts rely on the language and history
of the PDA."' Many courts, focusing on the second clause of the
107. California Government Code § 12945 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based upon a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification:
(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee affected by preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions ....
(2) To take a leave to account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of time;
provided, such period shall not exceed four months. Such employee shall be enti-
tled to utilize any accrued vacation leave during this period of time. Reasonable
period of time means that period during which the female employee is disabled on
account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945 (West 1982).
108. The employer, California Federal, contended that the state law was preempted
by Title VII because it conflicted with federal prohibitions against sex discrimination
and the PDA. Guerra, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 562.
109. Id. at 563.
110. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision
in California Federal Savings and Loan v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985). See
infra notes 190-96 and accompanying text for discussion of the Ninth Circuit's opinion.
111. See, eg., EEOC v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 591 F. Supp. 1128 (W.D.
Ark. 1984) (employer did not violate the PDA by evaluating an employee's medical
condition on an individual basis a reasonable time after the temporary disability began
and requiring the employee to furnish proof of additional leave as needed; all disabilities
were evaluated on this basis). Courts have addressed these additional questions:
(1) when an employer may lawfully terminate an employee because of pregnancy (see,
e.g., Harvey v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 533 F. Supp. 949 (D.N.C. 1982) (preg-
nant employee discharged even though she made out a prima facie case of pregnancy
discrimination because employer articulated that the legitimate nondiscriminatory rea-
son for the dismissal was the employee's influence on students as an unwed mother));
(2) when an employer must comply with the act (see, e.g., EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co.
Employees Relief Ass'n, 727 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1984) (when employer contributed to
employees' relief association, he was associated closely enough with the fund to be held
responsible for failure of the fund to provide pregnancy benefits as part of the disability
benefits for the relief association)); and (3) whether an employer must provide for abor-
tion-related disabilities (see, e.g., National Conference of Catholic Bishops v. Smith, 653
F.2d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (the conference sought declaratory and injunctive relief
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PDA,' 1 2 require employers to modify policies unfavorable to women.
In EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Employees Relief Association 1 3 the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held invalid a company-funded disabil-
ity policy administered by an employees' association because it gave no
financial benefits to employees on maternity leave." 4 The court sum-
marily stated that the employer was liable because he violated the stat-
utory duty imposed by the PDA." 5  In Barone v. Hackett," 6 the
Rhode Island district court found that an employer did not violate the
PDA by its failure to compensate pregnant women for the lower bene-
fits they received under state funded programs." 7 The employer's only
duty was to treat pregnant employees the same as others similarly situ-
ated with respect to the ability to work." 8
Also shedding light on the courts' attitude toward pregnancy dis-
crimination are the decisions involving dismissal policies and
mandatory maternity leaves. Working from the premise that a wo-
man's ability to perform her duties is the primary factor in allowing her
to continue to work, the courts often find employers liable for dis-
against enforcement of the PDA on grounds that it abridged their first amendment right
to freedom of religion)).
112. 42 US.C. § 2000e(k); See supra note 5 for text.
113. 727 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1984). The court found that when the employer partici-
pated in the employees' relief association and took advantage of the benefits conferred
upon its employees by membership in the association, the employer was responsible for
discriminating against women. Id. at 573-74.
114. Id. at 579. The plan provided financial assistance to all disabled employees,
except those disabled by pregnancy. Id. at 570.
115. Id. at 573. The court noted that the employer participated in, and benefited
from, the plan in such a way that it had not disassociated itself from the discriminatory
practice. Id. at 573-74. The Court found that "the employer's statutory duty is plain:
the employer must not discriminate on account of sex in dispensing disability benefits."
Id. at 573.
116. 28 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1765 (D.R.I. 1982).
117. Id. at 1769. State law required employers to make contributions to a state
temporary disability insurance fund. The state paid lower benefits for pregnancy-re-
lated disabilities than for other temporary disabilities. The pregnant employee claimed
that the employer must pay her additional benefits to compensate for the discrepancy in
state pay so that she, like her temporarily disabled coworker, would receive equal bene-
fits. Id. at 1766-68. The court determined that although the PDA requires employers
to treat pregnant employees the same as other workers, the Act does not require em-
ployers to ensure that pregnant employees receive the same level of benefits as their
coworkers. Id. at 1769-72.
118. Id. at 1770. The PDA "does not require employers to treat pregnant women
more favorably in order to compensate for discrimination caused by others." Id.
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missing pregnant women for no plausible reason.' 19 In Somers v. Al-
dine Independent School District,2 ° a Texas district court found that
the school district violated the PDA when it denied a pregnant teacher
leave with pay and ultimately fired her because she was pregnant.121
Employees, however, are not always successful in their attempts to
retain jobs on pregnancy discrimination grounds. As evidenced by the
decision in Conners v. University of Tennessee Press,'22 an employee
may establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the PDA, but
have the employer rebut with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
119. Many courts deciding employee challenges to benefit and dismissal policies on
the grounds of pregnancy discrimination apply the test set forth in Texas Dep't of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The Court outlined the test as follows:
Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the em-
ployer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes
the plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption,
the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in
the case.
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presumption of
discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone
else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason .... [If the defend-
ant is successful], the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now must have
the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason
for the employment decision.
Id. at 254-56. See Beck v. Quicktrip Corp., 708 F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 1983) (when an
employer dismissed a pregnant employee on grounds of insubordination and failure to
follow company policy, the employee showed the employee's reasons were pretextual;
she had followed procedures, had received no warning of possible dismissal, and had
knowledge that the employer considered her pregnancy a potential employment prob-
lem); Iodice v. Southeastern Packing & Gaskets, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D. Ga.
1983) (the employer successfully rebutted the employee's prima facie claim of preg-
nancy discrimination with proof that she did not satisfactorily complete her work de-
tails, even though the dismissal came shortly after the employer learned of the
pregnancy and signed a letter stating he felt she could no longer continue in her
condition).
120. 464 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
121. Id. at 902. The school board dismissed the pregnant teacher because she re-
fused to comply with the maternity policy requiring pregnant employees either to take a
mandatory leave of absence or face dismissal after the third month of pregnancy. Id.
The board did not require male employees to take mandatory unpaid sick leave or face
termination. Id. at 903. The court held that the policy discriminated against female
teachers on the basis of pregnancy, and therefore violated the PDA. Id.
122. 558 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Tenn. 1982). The employee alleged that the employer
forced her to resign after she requested an additional leave of absence without pay for a
pregnancy-related illness. Id. at 39. The employer, however, successfully showed that
the employee's short tenure, poor work record and past absence record were legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for the dismissal. Id. at 41. The court found that the em-
ployer would have treated her no differently if she suffered from another disability. Id.
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for denying the benefit.12 3 Courts have found poor performance, 124
need to fill the position, 125 excessive absences 126 and failure to uphold
the business' philosophy'27 justifiable reasons for termination.
Two of the more recent cases addressing dismissal policies consider
other factors in addition to the ability to perform. Reaching opposite
conclusions regarding the propriety of the respective policies, both
cases adhere to a form of the equal treatment theory. In Levin v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 128 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Delta
did not violate the PDA when it removed flight attendants from duty
upon learning of their pregnancies. 129 The court rejected the argument
of unfavorable treatment, agreeing with the employer that the policy
was necessary to ensure passenger safety. 13' The airline did not dis-
criminate because it removed from flight duty all persons with disabili-
123. Id. at 40.
124. See, e.g., Reeves v. Brand-Name Fashion Outlet, 532 F. Supp. 32 (W.D. Tenn.
1982) (employee's unsatisfactory work habits and failure to demonstrate enthusiasm for
the job justified the demotion).
125. Conners, 558 F. Supp. at 40.
126. Id.
127. Harvey, 533 F. Supp. at 955-56 (an employer's choice to dismiss an unwed
pregnant employee who counseled youth groups was not discriminatory because the
employee presented to the underprivileged young people a model which ran contrary to
the employer's philosophy and which was counterproductive to the job's goals).
128. 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984).
129. Id. at 1002. The Ninth Circuit also addressed mandatory maternity leave of
stewardesses in Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980),
reh'g denied (1981). The court found no violation of the PDA under a policy that
removed stewardesses from duty upon discovery of pregnancy. The court recognized
that the PDA made discrimination based on pregnancy unlawful per se, but under the
BFOQ analysis they found that nonpregnancy was a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion because pregnancy adversely affected passenger safety. Id. at 677.
For an in-depth review of Harriss, see Recent Decision, 20 DuQ. L. REV. 123 (1981).
130. Levin, 730 F.2d at 997. To meet a Title VII challenge, a discriminatory policy
must relate to the essence of the business. Because safety is the essence of an airline's
business, Delta had to show that a pregnancy policy substantially reduces the risks at-
tending air travel in order to overcome a Title VII challenge. Id. The court will uphold
a facially discriminatory policy only if the employer shows that the policy's contribution
to safety is more than minimal. Id. The court found that Delta met the first prong of
the test, for it showed that the leave policy greatly reduced the risk of severe injury to
passengers. Id. Pregnancy impairs the ability to perform routine and emergency safety
duties. The airline also satisfied the second prong of the test, which required them to
show a factual basis for the belief that all, or substantially all, pregnant flight attendants
would be unable to perform the duties safely. Id. at 998. Alternatively, the airline
could show that it was impossible to determine individually each attendant's capabili-
ties. Id. Inability to predict the effects pregnancy has on particular women makes it
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ties likely to jeopardize passenger safety.' 3
In another case focusing on factors other than pregnancy, the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that an employer could not
dismiss a pregnant employee merely because the work exposed her to
substances potentially harmful to the fetus.' 3 2 In Hayes v. Shelby Me-
morial Hospital,133 the court found that the hospital violated the PDA
when it dismissed a pregnant X-ray technicians.' 34 The court noted
that the hospital intended to apply the fetal health policy only to preg-
nant x-ray technicians. 135 The court outlined the test for fetal protec-
tion policies that only apply to one sex. 136 "The policy violates Title
VII unless the employer shows (1) that a substantial risk of harm ex-
ists; and (2) that the risk is borne by members of one sex; and (3) the
employee fails to show that there are acceptable alternative policies
which would have a lesser impact on the attected sex."' 137 The court
held that the hospital failed the test and was, therefore, liable. 38
difficult for employers to deal with pregnancy on an individualized basis. Id. Non-
pregnancy, therefore, is a bona fide occupational qualification for flight attendants. Id.
131. Id. at 998-99. Stewardesses argued that although Delta cited safety as a justifi-
cation for the pregnancy policy, the airline did not make comparable efforts to remove
from flight duty attendants who suffered other medical conditions that might be simi-
larly incapacitating, such as epilepsy and diabetes. Id. at 998. Therefore, they argued,
the safety considerations were pretextual and Delta acted discriminatorily toward them.
Id. The court rejected this argument. It reasoned that a plaintiff could not use pretext
to overcome a BFOQ. Id. Even if that were a proper rebuttal, the plaintiffs could not
succeed because the company had not discriminated; the airline did restrict attendants
with debilitating diseases from flight duty. Id. at 999.
132. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984). Several
commentators have addressed the relationship between employer fetal-protection poli-
cies and the PDA. See generally Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The
Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals under Title VII,
69 GEO. L.J. 641 (1981) (the author urges equal treatment for all women under the
PDA and other policies that keep women on the job despite potential hazards). See also
Note, Fetal Vulnerability and the 1978 Pregnancy Amendments-Wright v. Olin Corp.,
19 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 905 (1983). The author outlines the merits of another deci-
sion in which the court held unlawful a policy excluding women from certain jobs be-
cause of fetal exposure to toxic substances. See Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172
(4th Cir. 1982).
133. 726 F.2d 1543 (1lth Cir. 1984).
134. Id. at 1554.
135. Id. at 1550.
136. Id. at 1554.
137. Id.
138. Id. See also Fancher v. Nimmo, 549 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (em-
ployer's failure to reinstate employee as an X-ray technician, after the hospital required
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As this line of cases suggests, courts applying the equal treatment
standard consider pregnancy-related disabilities comparable to other
physical conditions that affect the ability to work. 139 Thus, the equal
treatment theorists rely not only on the PDA's statutory language and
legislative history, but also on judicial interpretations of the Act."
Nevertheless, the solid foundation upon which the equal treatment
standard rests does not foreclose the possibility that courts might con-
sider alternative solutions to pregnancy discrimination that are also
plausible. 141
B. Equal Opportunity Theory
1. The Theory
The equal opportunity theory embodies the philosophy that equal
treatment breeds a discriminatory result, while preferential treatment
fosters an equal one.142 A uniformly applied policy denies equal em-
ployment opportunity because the policy has a disparate impact on
pregnant workers. 1 3 If employers provide inadequate disability bene-
her to leave that position because of pregnancy and a desire to protect the fetus, is a
discriminatory policy under the PDA).
139. See supra notes 95-137 and accompanying text. The exception to this rule
arises when the interests of third parties, such as passengers, are jeopardized by the
condition of the pregnant employee. See, e.g., Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d
994 (5th Cir. 1984).
140. See supra 95-137 and accompanying text (cases supporting the equal treatment
view).
141. See infra notes 144-63 and accompanying text (discussing the equal opportu-
nity model). Professor Herma Hill Kay argues that continued adherence to the equal
treatment model founders on the fact that men and women have sexual reproductive
differences. She suggests that scholars "direct our energies to devising ways to accom-
modate and neutralize the impact of those differences on the lives of women and men."
Kay, supra note 75, at 88.
142. See A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 38.00-.07
(1985). The authors detail the problems of pregnant employees, and advocate an equal
opportunity solution. See also Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 690 (1983). The author labels those who advocate une-
qual treatment of pregnant women to help them reach equal opportunity as
..pluralists." Id. at 707. Herma Hill Kay calls this equal opportunity model a pluralist
view because the proponents of this approach acknowledge that the capacity to become
pregnant is one of the few immutable differences that distinguish women from men and
seek to build a model of equality accommodating women's fertility and neutralizing its
barrier to personal achievement. See Kay, supra note 75, at 40.
143. The disparate impact theory involves situations in which an employee con-
cedes that a policy is neutral, but claims it disproportionately affects a protected class.
To establish a prima facie case, the employee does not have to show intent to discrimi-
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fits, the policy equally harms both male and female employees with
respect to nongender related conditions. This policy, however, places
women at an additional disadvantage, because only they can become
pregnant.'44
The equal opportunity theory turns primarily on the sexual repro-
ductive differences between men and women. 145 Pregnancy forces a
large number of female laborers to take some period of leave and incur
medical expenses. The problems multiply when employers fail to ade-
quately compensate women for the inconveniences of pregnancy. Em-
ployers rarely provide adequate disability benefits for those women
segregated in a group of female-oriented jobs in the secondary labor
market. 146 This failure leaves these marginal workers at a distinct dis-
advantage compared to male coworkers in comparable jobs. 14 7 Wo-
men fall behind in the race for equal opportunity because men never
incur job losses, wage reductions or medical expenses for pregnancy-
related disabilities.
nate, but only that the policy has a disparate impact. The employer can then argue the
business necessity defense. Courts require that the employer show the policy has a
"demonstrable relationship to successful performance on the job" or that it "effectively
carries out a business purpose." See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
If the employer is successful in establishing business necessity, the employee may then
attempt to show that there are "acceptable alternative policies or practices that would
better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a
lesser differential racial impact." Id. at 798. The Supreme Court first recognized this
approach in Griggs, in which the Court stated that "[t]he Act proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation."
Id. at 431. See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). For an overview of the
business necessity defense, see Williams, supra note 131, at 687.
144. See A. LARSON, supra note 141, at § 38.22.
145. See Krieger & Cooney, supra note 10, at 542. The authors note that a strict
equal treatment view fails to focus on the sex difference that pregnancy entails, on the
relative positions of men and women in society and on the goal of assuring equality of
opportunity within a heterogeneous society.
146. Id. at 520.
147. Larson points out:
Clearly, if an employer says, "All pregnant employees will be fired," there is sex
differentiation. It is really no different in effect to say, "No maternity leaves will be
granted."... [S]ome leave accompanying childbirth is an accepted modern neces-
sity, and a policy denying it, with discharge as the alternative, is tantamount to a
policy of outright discharge for pregnancy.., it is sex differentiation not to offer to
women a benefit denied to men-maternity leave. The reason is that this "inequal-
ity" is necessary to provide substantial equality of employment opportunity.
A. LARSON, supra note 141, § 38.22, at 8-31, 32 (emphasis in original).
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Those advancing the equal opportunity theory argue that pregnancy
benefit policies must account for the immutable sexual differences that
distinguish women from men by giving women preferential treat-
ment.14 ' Like the equal treatment theory, the equal opportunity ap-
proach requires employers to remedy disparate treatment.1 49  The
theory goes a step further, however, because it requires employers to
extend pregnancy disability benefits, although they offer no benefits for
similar disabilities, in order to remedy disparate impact.150 The PDA
is inadequate to treat disparate impact in situations when the employer
supplies inadequate benefits. Even though all employees are treated
the same, no man faces the same expenses or risks dismissal for failure
to work as a pregnant female worker does. 5 '
The equal opportunity theorists advocate affirmative legislation.' 52
Some proponents argue that the PDA does not bar pregnancy-positive
legislation because Title VII does not forbid such legislation. 153 They
148. Larson notes:
We have here an example of the kind of case in which an "equality" issue cannot
be disposed of by decreeing that the sexes shall be treated exactly alike. Instead, we
must build upon a quite different premise: when the two sexes are dissimilar in that
one sex exclusively possesses a trait which the other, without exception, does not
possess, and when that trait has a bearing upon employability, it is a differentiation
based on sex to treat the two sexes similarly as to that trait.
A. LARSON, supra note 141, § 38.22, at 8-31 (emphasis in original).
149. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
150. See Note. supra note 141, at 707. "[A] pluralist approach, in practice, requires
disability benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities when they are offered for non-
pregnancy-related disabilities. It also requires, however, that benefits for pregnancy-
related disabilities be provided even where no benefits are offered for nonpregnancy-
related disabilities." Id.
151. See supra note 146. See also Note, supra note 141, at 726. "[A]n employer
who adopts a sex-blind no-leave-of-absence policy discriminates against women by fail-
ing to recognize and compensate for the different reproductive roles of the sexes."
152. Some states have already taken steps to accommodate for this disparate im-
pact. For example, Connecticut law provides:
(a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section...
(7) for an employer, by himself or his agent:
(A) to terminate a woman's employment because of her pregnancy;
(B) to refuse to grant to that employee a reasonable leave of absence for
disability resulting from her pregnancy ...
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (1982).
153. See Note, supra note 141, at 690. Title VII preempts state employment legisla-
tion in situations in which the state law requires an act unlawful under Title VII. Equal
opportunity advocates claim that Title VII does not forbid state pregnancy-positive leg-
islation because both the PDA and special pregnancy legislation work to prohibit sex
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. The Supreme Court, in Shaw v. Delta Air-
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claim that the PDA does not prohibit, even if it does not require, prac-
tices designed to accommodate pregnant workers with no counterpart
for nonpregnant workers.154 On the contrary, special legislation fur-
thers the purpose of the PDA to prohibit sex discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy.' 55 Preemption does not bar protective state legisla-
tion. Given courts' traditional deference to state police powers,, 5 6 pre-
emption is inappropriate absent an unambiguous congressional
mandate.157 Other proponents, however, argue that the PDA does pre-
empt special legislation. Therefore, to enable women to attain equal
opportunity, Congress should reformulate the statute to require special
treatment. 158
In response to equal treatment advocates' denouncement of preferen-
tial laws, the equal opportunity theorists refute the idea that special
laws further dangerous stereotypes. 159 First, the laws are not protec-
tive policies because they restrict neither job availability nor working
conditions.' 60 Rather, the statutes assure women that they will retain
lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983), held that Title VII is neutral on the subject of all employ-
ment practices it does not prohibit. Id. at 103. Therefore, special legislation and the
PDA do not conflict because Congress specifically did not forbid special legislation to
redress disparate impact.
154. See Kay, supra note 75, at 82.
155. Congress repeatedly declared this a major goal of the PDA. See, e.g., H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 1786, supra note 40, at 4765. See also supra notes 151-53 and accom-
panying text.
156. "The concept of police power is defined to include the power to enact legisla-
tion for the promotion of public health, safety, morals, peace, and welfare." See gener-
ally VAN ALSTYNE, KARST, GERARD, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71 (1983). This
definition brings the issue of pregnancy discrimination clearly within the purview of
state police power.
157. In preemption analysis, courts start with the assumption that the historic po-
lice power of the states is not superceded by a federal act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress. Florida Avocado & Lime Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963). There is no such clear and manifest purpose in the legislative history of the
PDA indicating that Congress intended to abolish totally all statutes that treat preg-
nancy preferentially.
158. See Krieger & Cooney, supra note 10, at 514.
159. Id. at 532. Affirmative legislation is not harmful because no man will ever
need these policies and no pregnant woman is forced to take part in the benefits. It
merely puts a pregnant employee on equal footing with men and permits her to compete
equally in the labor market. It does not provide women an additional benefit denied to
men; rather, it merely prevents women from suffering an additional burden no man
bears. Id. at 533.
160. Cf Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (protec-
tive legislation that denies women entire categories of jobs is unlawful).
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their jobs when hampered with pregnancy-related disabilities.'61 Sec-
ond, Title VII does not invalidate this type of protective legislation.' 62
Unlike other statutes, the pregnancy-positive legislation will not cause
over-and under-inclusive classifications because such legislation does
not require different treatment of women and men based on stereotypic
assumptions about the sexes. 163  Special pregnancy laws merely ac-
count for biological differences; the laws place men and women on
equal footing, thus permitting women to compete successfully in the
labor market."6
2. Legislative and Administrative Bases
The equal opportunity theory finds support in the statutory lan-
guage. The PDA is a definitional statute, and when read in the context
of Title VII's substantive provisions, the Act suggests that Congress
intended to provide equal opportunities to pregnant employees and to
protect against disparate impact. Although the PDA mandates equal
treatment for pregnant employees based on their ability to work, it also
defines "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" as including "because
of or on the basis of pregnancy."' 6 5 Therefore, when one applies the
PDA's definition to a substantive provision of Title VII such as section
2000(e)-2, which declares it unlawful for an employer to "discharge
any individual ... because of such individual's ... sex ... ,,166 section
2000(e)-2 appears to prohibit an employer from discharging an em-
ployee because she is pregnant, regardless of whether an employer
would discharge a similarly disabled, but nonpregnant, employee. 167
161. See Krieger & Cooney, supra note 10, at 531.
162. For an example of beneficial legislation that Title VII does prohibit, see Home-
makers, Inc. v. Division on Indus. Welfare, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974) (invalidating a
state law that required employers to pay overtime to female, but not male, employees).
163. See Krieger & Cooney, supra note 10, at 532-33.
164. See generally Krieger & Cooney, supra note 10.
165. For pertinent text of the PDA, see supra note 5.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1981).
167. Section 2000e, which contains the PDA, is a definitional section. One can rea-
sonably interpret this section as sanctioning special treatment policies. The first clause
of section 2000e(k) defines "because of sex" as "because of pregnancy." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k). See supra notes 39-59 and accompanying text (Congress intended to amend
§ 2000e to include a definition of discrimination on the basis of pregnancy). Placing the
words "because of pregnancy" into certain substantive provisions of the equal employ-
ment opportunities section of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1981), indicates that
employers must provide preferential treatment to pregnant employees. For example, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1981) reads:
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Consequently, equal opportunity theorists may argue that the PDA's
statutory language permits special treatment of pregnant women. 168
Legislative history also supports the equal opportunity theory. Con-
gress enacted the PDA to clarify the definition of sex discrimination to
guarantee working women protection against all forms of employment
discrimination. 169 Congress did not intend to diminish the protection
available under Title VII, which included protection against disparate
impact.170 Congress specifically referred to equal opportunity. The
House report notes that "the elimination of discrimination based on
It shall be an unlawful employment practice... (1) to hire or to discharge... or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's
* . . sex.., or (2) to limit.., his employees... in any way which would deprive...
any individual of employment opportunities ... because of... sex ....
Id. Substituting "because of pregnancy" for "because of sex," one author notes that the
law appears to flatly prohibit an employer from discharging an employee because she is
pregnant even if he would discharge similarly disabled nonpregnant employees. See
supra note 12, at 635. See also Opening Brief of State Appellants at 17, California
Federal Savings & Loan v. Guerra, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 563 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(noting the effects of this substitution). The two clauses in the PDA make the statute
very unclear. Although definitional in nature, the second clause seems to be a substan-
tive provision. See supra note 5. Consequently, no clear interpretation emerges. See
also Note, supra Note 141, at 694-99 (outlining the discrepancies in the PDA's
language).
168. The opponents of specialist legislation argue that the second clause is a sub-
stantive provision that limits protection for pregnant employees to the prohibition of
disparate treatment. See Note, supra note 12, at 625-37 (outlining the conflict between
the definitional and substantive portions of the PDA). See also Note, supra note 141, at
694. In this Note, the author notes that the two clauses of the PDA support different
answers to the question of what is required of employers who offer no disability benefits.
One reading of the PDA suggests that the second clause gives substance to the first. Id.
Some courts and commentators endorse this reading. See EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles
& Space Co., 680 F.2d 12343, 1245 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Barkett, Pregnancy Dis-
crimination-Purpose, Effect, and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 16 J. FAM. L. 401, 482
n.306 (1978). An alternative interpretation focuses on the first clause of the Act and
reads it in conjunction with the other Title VII provisions. See Note, supra note 141, at
695. Consequently, courts read "because of or on the basis of pregnancy" as an abso-
lute ban on pregnancy discrimination, no matter how employers treat other disabilities.
Id.
169. See H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 40, at 3. Legislators intended the PDA to
incorporate discrimination on the basis of pregnancy into the definition of sex discrimi-
nation and to ensure working women protection against all forms of sex discrimination.
Id.
170. Senator Javits stated:
This legislation does not represent a new initiative in employment discrimination
law, neither does it attempt to expand the reach of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 into new areas of employment relationships. Rather, this bill is simply
corrective legislation, designed to restore the law with respect to pregnant women
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pregnancy ... will go a long way toward providing equal employment
opportunities for women, the goal of Title VII.' 17 ' This statement
provides evidence that Congress intended to formulate a law that cre-
ates equality in result. 1
72
Beyond direct references to equal opportunity, there is additional ev-
idence that Congress recognized pregnancy's disparate impact on em-
ployment opportunities. Legislators repeatedly referred to statistics
evidencing the hardships that pregnant workers often face. 17 3 Con-
gress implicitly acknowledged the adverse physical, emotional and fi-
nancial impact pregnancy has on both the worker and her family.174
Unlike men, women encounter pregnancy disabilities in addition to dis-
abilities comparable to those shared by nonpregnant coworkers.175
Additionally, Congress approved the increased costs the PDA would
impose on employers providing disability benefits.1 76  Congressmen
employees to the point where it was last year, before the Supreme Court's decision
in [Gilbert] ....
123 CONG. REC. 29,387 (1977).
171. H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 40, at 4755.
172. See Note, supra note 141, at 726. ("The PDA calls for.., equality in result.").
173. Congress noted that 80% of all women become pregnant during their working
lives; 40% of these women are employed during their pregnancy; 40% of all mothers
with children under six are employed; the average leave of absence for pregnancy is six
to eight weeks; 60% of the women return to work; and 70% of the women who work do
so out of need to support their families because they are married to husbands who earn
less than $7000 or because they are single. See 123 CONG. REC. 29,385-88, 29,641-64
(1977).
174. Congress noted that a large number of working women are heads of house-
holds and that the income in these homes is less than households with male heads. 123
CONG. REC. 29,386-87 (1977). Discrimination based on pregnancy not only singles out
and discriminates against women as women, "it also discriminates against the
childbearing process." Id. at 29,661 (remarks of Sen. Biden).
175. See supra notes 59-60, 168-71 and accompanying text.
176. By approving increased employer expenditures to cover all female disabilities,
sums greater than those required to cover all male disabilities, Congress implied that it
endorsed policies giving more to pregnant women to place them at an equal opportunity
level as their coworkers. The cost estimate for employers implementing pregnancy ben-
efit policies ranged from $130 million to $1.7 billion. S. REP. No. 331, supra note 40, at
9; CONG. REC. 29,660 (1977). The House and Senate Committees found the Depart-
ment of Labor's $191.5 million estimate to be reasonable. This represented a 3.5%
increase in total contributions to temporary disability plans. H.R. REP. No. 948, supra
note 40, at 9-10; S. REP. No. 331, supra note 40, at 10-11. See also Note, supra note 12,
at 627 n.133 (summarizing the cost estimates the House and Senate Committees re-
viewed). Some who opposed the bill referred to the cost with hope to defeat the plan.
Other legislators believed the issue should be left to collective bargaining. 123 CONG.
REC. 29,659 (remarks of Sen. Helms).
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characterized higher costs involved in policies including pregnancy
benefits as a necessary element of the equalization process.177 Employ-
ers do not discriminate when they provide greater benefits per dollar to
women than men. 17
8
Congress also cited special state pregnancy laws without giving an
indication that they intended to override these statutes. 179 The House
Report noted that many states already required employers to provide
pregnancy benefits. 8 ' One representative stated that states have au-
thority to require more than federal law so long as they do not conflict
with federal law. 8 If Congress intended to preempt state laws, it
could have expressly forbidden them or not have cited them so
favorably. 182
The EEOC also lends credence to the equal opportunity theory. 183
177. H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 40, at 4757. Congress noted that employer
costs would increase for disability and health insurance. Id. One estimate was that the
employer would incur an additional cost of $18.84 per employee. 123 CONG. REc.
29,650 (1977).
178. By requiring the inclusion of pregnancy disability benefits in employee disabil-
ity programs on the same basis as other disabilities, Congress acknowledged that it was
also requiring employers to spend more per female employee than per male. Congress
justified the different expenditures as compensation for the unequal social taxes that
pregnancy imposes on women. Thus, under the PDA, men and women are accorded
different treatment in order to insure equality in the result-a pluralist conception of
sexual equality. See Note, supra note 141, at 710.
179. The House report includes the finding that "the following six states, as well as
the District of Columbia, specially include pregnancy in their Fair Employment Prac-
tices Law: Alaska, Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, Oregon, and Montana." H.R.
REP. No. 948, supra note 40, at 4749, 4759.
180. Both Montana and Connecticut require employers to provide women employ-
ees with reasonable pregnancy disability leave and reinstatement. See Montana Mater-
nity Leave Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-310 (1984) and Connecticut Human Rights
and Opportunities Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (1983).
181. See 124 CONG. REc. 6864 (remarks of Rep. Sarasin).
182. See H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 40, at 4759. The idea of singling out a
certain characteristic for special treatment is not unusual. Congress has done this on
several occasions. For example, Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1982), to integrate handicapped people into the workforce. The Act provides
special services to give the handicapped an opportunity to participate in the job market.
The law mandates different treatment of the handicapped in order to redress the initial
inequalities between otherwise similarly situated people. The PDA states that discrimi-
nation because of pregnancy violates Title VII. Thus, the PDA could be interpreted to
require different treatment as a means to compensate for sex-based inequalities between
otherwise similarly situated people. Note, supra note 141, at 718-19.
183. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1985). For text of the guidelines, see supra notes 60-
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The EEOC reissued guidelines on pregnancy related employment poli-
cies after the PDA's enactment.184 Neither subsection (a) nor (c) in-
corporates the PDA's principle that employers treat disabled pregnant
and nonpregnant workers the same. 85 Subsection (c) states that an
employer who terminates a pregnant employee under an employment
policy that provides no leave, or insufficient leave, violates the Act un-
less business necessity justifies the decision.' 86 Consequently, the
EEOC guidelines give pregnancy-disabled employees more job security
than those unable to work because of comparable disabilities. 187 Addi-
tionally, the EEOC determined that it is not a defense to a charge of
sex discrimination that the cost of benefits is greater with respect to one
sex than the other.' 88 Monetary outlays by employers who provide
comprehensive medical coverage would be greater for women than
men because of inclusion of pregnancy benefits. These regulations indi-
cate that the EEOC intended to remedy disparate impact, thus provid-
ing pregnant women with enhanced equal employment
opportunities. ' 8 9
3. Judicial Support for Equal Opportunity
A few courts that have addressed pregnancy discrimination ac-
184. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1985). The EEOC originally issued the guidelines in
1972 and reissued them with only minor modifications in 1979. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10
(1979).
185. 29 C.F.R. 1604.10(a), (c) (1985). See Note, supra note 12, at 635.
186. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (1985).
187. Id.
188. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (1985).
189. Federal enforcement agencies have interpreted other federal laws forbidding
employment discrimination to require employers to provide maternity leave whether or
not they provide leave to other employees. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1981) (prohibits sex
discrimination in employment in education programs). Title IX, for example, is
designed to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex in activities receiving federal
financial assistance. The EEOC issued guidelines pursuant to Title IX which provide
that a recipient shall treat pregnancy the same as other temporary disabilities with re-
spect to any medical plan it participates in; however:
In the case of a recipient which does not maintain a leave policy for its students,
or in the case of a student who does not otherwise qualify for leave under such a
policy, a recipient shall treat pregnancy, childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of
pregnancy and recovery therefrom as a justification for a leave of absence for so
long a period of time as is deemed medically necessary by the student's physician,
at the conclusion of which the student shall be reinstated to the status which she
held when the leave began.
7 C.F.R. § 15a.40(b)(5) (1985).
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knowledge the equal opportunity theory. The decisions indicate a
trend toward approval of special treatment policies despite the PDA's
arguably restrictive language.190
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took a prominent
stand on equal opportunity grounds and reversed the California district
court's decision in Guerra.191 The appellate court upheld a California
statute that extends mandatory pregnancy disability leave to pregnant
employees. 192 The appellate court determined that the PDA did not
preempt the California statute.1 93 According to the court, states can
require employers to extend extra benefits to pregnant employees be-
190. See infra notes 190-212 and accompanying text. Some believe that Newport
News, 462 U.S. 669 (1983), is not a bar to preferential treatment. See Reply Brief of
State Appellants at 16-17, California Fed. Say. & Loan v. Guerra, 34 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (C.D. Cal. 1984); Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, at 22, California
Fed. Say. & Loan v. Guerra, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (D.C. Cal. 1984); see also supra
note 105.
191. California Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 34 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 562 (C.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985).
192. Id. at 396. See supra note 106 for text of the California statute. See also supra
notes 104-08 and accompanying text (discussing the district court's opinion based on
the equal treatment theory). The Ninth Circuit found invalid the district court's con-
clusion that the California statute discriminates against men on the basis of pregnancy.
The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Newport News, 462 U.S. 669 (1983). The appellate
court observed that the district court misread the Supreme Court's opinion in formulat-
ing the rule that employers may disregard a state statutory obligation to provide preg-
nancy disability leave. 758 F.2d at 393. According to the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court "measured equivalence of benefits by the comprehensiveness of their coverage of
the disabilities to which each sex is subject, while Cal Fed seeks to measure equality of
benefits by the sameness of coverage despite the difference of needs." Id. According to
the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court's Newport News decision does not prohibit stat-
utes giving preferential treatment to pregnant employees. Id. "Newport News not only
does not prohibit section 12945(b)(2), it provides a framework for harmonizing the Cali-
fornia statute and the PDA." Id.
193. Id. at 394. The court narrowed its inquiry to the question of whether Title VII
preempts the California statute. The court concluded that Title VII does not prevent
states from extending nondiscrimination laws to areas not covered by Title VII. Id. at
394 (citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2903 (1983)). In addition, the court
quoted Title VII's preemption provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-7, 2000h-4, to substanti-
ate its position that Title VII does not invalidate state antidiscrimination laws unless
they are inconsistent with Title VII. 758 F.2d at 394. The court found that the Califor-
nia statute is not inconsistent with Title VII's PDA. Id. at 396. The Ninth Circuit
refused to decide whether Title VII compels employers to grant reasonable pregnancy
leave to protect women from disparate impact of facially neutral, but inadequate, disa-
bility leave policies. Id. at 394. The court also did not decide whether some set of facts
might show that the statute harms a woman's quest for employment, thus rendering
§ 12945(b)(2) invalid. Id. at 394. Because § 12945(b)(2) deals with pregnancy, the
court pointed out that this decision does not affect the lawfulness of statutes that classify
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cause the PDA provides "a floor beneath which benefits may not
drop-not a ceiling above which they may not rise."'1 94 A pregnancy
statute or employment policy, however, must "further Title VII's pro-
phylactic purpose of achieving equality of employment opportuni-
ties.""' The proper measure of equality compares coverage to actual
need, not coverage to hypothetical need.196 In conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit stated that pregnancy disability leave is a "means to the goal of
equal employment opportunity. ' "'97
Two other courts, ruling on the validity of a Montana pregnancy
statute, further extolled the merits of the equal opportunity theory. In
direct conflict with the California federal district court's decision in
Guerra,98 the Montana district court upheld special treatment legisla-
tion. In Miller- Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor and Industry, 99
the federal district court upheld the Montana Maternity Leave Act
(MMLA),2 °° which prevented employers from dismissing women be-
on the basis of sex-linked characteristics that are more stereotypical than biological. Id.
at 395.
194. Id. at 396. The court reached this conclusion on the basis of several factors.
First, Congress enacted the PDA to change the result of Gilbert and its logic that preg-
nancy discrimination is not sex discrimination. Id. at 395. Second, Congress sanc-
tioned the expenditure of more dollars on medical coverage for female employees than
for male employees in order to render equally comprehensive health benefits. Id. Fi-
nally, the court reasoned that the PDA does not demand that state laws be blind to
pregnancy, for Congress adopted the Gilbert dissent that takes pregnancy into account.
Id. at 395.
195. Id. at 396 (quoting EEOC v. Pugent Sound Log Scaling & Grading Co., 752
F.2d 1389, 1392 (9th Cir. 1985)).
196. Id. at 396.
197. Id. The court noted that it was not the first to announce that the goal of Title
VII is equality of opportunity rather than sameness of treatment, for the Supreme Court
in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), set precedent for the finding. 758
F.2d at 396 n.7.
198. Guerra, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 562. See supra notes 104-08 and
accompanying text.
199. 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont. 1981), vacated, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982).
The Miller-Wohl Co. fired an employee because she missed several days of work due to
pregnancy. The company had no sick leave policy for any illness during the first year of
employment. The employee charged that the employer violated the Montana Maternity
Leave Act (MMLA) and the Commissioner found for the employee. In response, the
company filed a declaratory judgment action maintaining that the MMLA was pre-
empted by the PDA because the MMLA requires more than equal treatment. Id. at
1089. The district court held that the PDA did not preempt the MMLA. Miller-Wohl,
515 F Supp. at 1267.
200. The Montana Maternity Leave Act provides:
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cause of pregnancy and refusing them a reasonable leave of absence.2"'
The court rejected the argument that the PDA and MMLA conflict. 02
The court noted that Congress did not intend to exclude state laws on
employment discrimination. 0 3 The employer could comply with both
statutes if it raised the benefits for other nonoccupational disabilities in
line with the MMLA's requirements for pregnancy. Such a policy
would protect pregnancy-disabled women, and at the same time pro-
vide equal treatment for all employees.2° The court refuted the argu-
ment that the MMLA was undesirable protectionist legislation, and
upheld the statute.20 5
In Miller- Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor and Industry, jurisdic-
tional conflicts gave the Montana Supreme Court an opportunity to
review the MMLA.2 °6 The Montana court also upheld the statute. It
It shall be unlawful for an employer or his agent to:
(1) terminate a woman's employment because of her pregnancy;
(2) refuse to grant to the employee a reasonable leave of absence for such preg-
nancy;
(3) deny to the employee who is disabled as a result of pregnancy any compen-
sation to which she is entitled as a result of the accumulation of disability or leave
benefits accrued pursuant to plans maintained by her employer, provided that the
employer may require disability as a result of pregnancy to be verified by medical
certification that the employee is not able to perform her employment duties; or
(4) require that an employee take a mandatory maternity leave for an unrea-
sonable length of time ....
[U]pon signifying her intent to return at the end of her leave of absence, such
employee shall be reinstated to her original job or to an equivalent position with
equivalent pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits, and other
service credits unless, in the case of a private employer, the employer's circum-
stances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-310, 49-2-311 (1983).
201. Id.
202. Miller-Wohl, 515 F. Supp. at 1267.
203. Id. The Guerra federal district court had rejected a similar proposal. Guerra,
34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 568.
204. Miller-Wohl, 515 F. Supp. at 1267. Some see this solution as a workable
model. See Williams, supra note 9, at 197. Williams noted that there is nothing wrong
with the general purpose of the Montana law. Reasonable leave time should be avail-
able for all disabilities. The problem arises when it is only provided to a select group.
205. Miller- Wohl, 515 F. Supp. at 1267.
206. 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984), appealfiled, No. 84-1545 (U.S. Apr. 9, 1985).
The Montana Supreme Court upheld the MMLA following lengthy decisions by other
courts hearing the same case. Id. at 1254. The federal district court upheld the
MMLA. See supra notes 197-204 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit, however,
refused to reach the merits of the case; they determined that the issue was not a federal
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said that the purpose of the MMLA is to protect equal job opportuni-
ties for women by removing a disability job risk that nonpregnant em-
ployees do not face.207 Because the MMLA's goal is in accordance
with Title VII's equality objective, the MMLA's gender-based policy
does not violate the PDA.2 "8 The Montana Supreme Court also sug-
gested that employers could satisfy all interests by bringing all em-
ployee disability policies in line with state mandated pregnancy laws,
but the court refused to rewrite the law to reflect this opinion.2 °9
Another court, dealing with a pregnancy benefit policy under the
PDA rather than a special treatment statute, acknowledged the equal
opportunity theory. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the need for adequate leaves of absence in Abraham v. Graphic
Arts International Union.2"' The court determined that an inadequate
maternity leave policy violatives Title VII as much as a policy that
specifically forbids maternity leave. 2 11 The court noted that only fe-
male employees face job losses from pregnancy.212 Therefore, a leave
policy applied equally to both male and female employees that estab-
lished a ten day limit on sick leave violated Title VII because of its
disparate impact on pregnant employees.2" 3
matter. Miller-Wohl v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir.
1982). Miller-Wohl then petitioned the state court for review of the Commissioner's
decision that the company violated the MMLA. The District Court of Cascade County
found that the MMLA was discriminatory. 692 P.2d at 1246. The court found that the
protective and preferential statute unlawfully favored nondisabled pregnant employees,
because they too received leave time. Id. Therefore, Title VII preempted the Montana
law. Id.
207. Id. at 1244-45.
208. Id. at 1245.
209. Id. The ACLU, NOW, and League of Women Voters argued that although the
MMLA was protectionist legislation, and a violation of Title VII, the court could pre-
serve the statute by extending its benefits to both sexes. Id. at 1253. The Montana
Supreme Court, however, noting that such extension would end arguments that the
MMLA is discriminatory, refused to extend the benefits to nonpregnant employees.
The court instead encouraged the state legislature to enact measures extending the bene-
fits to nonpregnant employees. Id. at 1255.
210. 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
211 Id. at 819.
212. Id. at 817.
213. Id. at 819. The court found that the policy was not justified by business neces-
sity. Id. See also Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1150 (1983). In Brown, the Fourth Circuit rejected the premise that employers
should treat pregnancy like any other illness. It upheld the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12), which prohibited employers from denying pregnancy dis-
ability benefits to pregnant workers, regardless of how the employer treats employees
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Obviously, the courts have provided different answers to the preg-
nancy discrimination problem.214 The confusion stems from the
PDA's language, its legislative history and societal values. To resolve
the dilemma Congress must reexamine its handiwork.
IV. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
What is the proper solution to pregnancy discrimination? Although
both the equal treatment and equal opportunity theories purport to be
definitive, the answer lies ultimately with Congress. It must reevaluate
both the goal it attempted to achieve and the means it implemented to
reach that end. As these proposals suggest, perhaps neither theory is
correct, and Congress should reformulate the statute through
compromise.215
A. Congressional Reevaluation
The split of authority and the aura of confusion surrounding the
PDA require congressional reevaluation of both the rationale and stan-
dard underlying the Act. Acting in the wake of Gilbert,2 16 Congress
failed to examine the evidence thoroughly or to consider fully the con-
sequences of its legislation.2 7 Had it done both, it is likely that the
solution for pregnancy discrimination would more closely resemble the
equal opportunity model.
The foregoing overview"' reveals several major issues requiring con-
with other disabilities. Id. at 1004-05. See also Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 517
P.2d 599 (1983) (invalidating a plan that denied unemployment compensation to all
disabled workers on grounds that female workers who chose to become mothers, but
not male workers who became fathers, lost economic benefits because of their decision
to bear children).
214. See supra notes 95-137,189-212 and accompanying text.
215. See infra notes 246-76 and accompanying text.
216. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). See supra notes 25-31 and
accompanying text. Only eight months passed between the Supreme Court's Gilbert
decision and the introduction of the PDA to Congress.
217. In reaction to the Supreme Court's decisions, Congress acted swiftly. Congress
looked at the problem from a factual viewpoint: an employer gave women some bene-
fits, but fewer than those it gave to others with similar disabilities. Congress acted to
correct this specific imbalance. It is this narrow focus which fostered the development
of the "same treatment" standard; a standard adequate to correct the Gilbert-type prob-
lem, but not broad enough in scope to provide a solution for all of the pregnancy-related
disadvantages suffered by women.
218. See supra notes 74-83, 141-63 for a review of the differences between the equal
treatment and equal opportunity models for equality in the workplace.
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gressional attention. First, Congress should clearly enunciate its pur-
pose. 219  There are indications that the legislators believed equal
treatment was the appropriate procedure, but that equal opportunity
was the ultimate goal. 220 Neither the debates nor the reports provide
sufficient guidance to courts and employers. The multifarious signals
bring mixed decisions.2 2 '
To make an informed policy decision the legislators must examine
several pertinent factors. Such factors include: the number of women
in the workforce, 2 2 2 the number of employees who become pregnant
each year,22 3 the number of births per worker,2 24 the number of em-
ployers who provide benefits,2 25 the level of benefits provided,2 26 bene-
219. Congress could make the purpose of the PDA clearer by removing it from the
definitional section of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e) to another section containing sub-
stantive provisions.
220. See supra notes 141-81 and accompanying text (discussing the merits of the
equal opportunity standard and the manner in which Congress dealt with the theory).
221. See supra notes 84-137 and 164-212 and accompanying text (Congressional
and judicial approval of both theories).
222. There are approximately 48.5 million women in the civilian labor force. Bu-
REAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1985, 394 (1985). See 123 CONG. REC. 29,386 (evidence that Con-
gress had similar statistics before them).
223. In 1982, of the 48,666,000 women 18 to 44 years of age who gave birth to a
child, 33,224,000 were in the labor force. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1985, 61 (1984). Eighty-
five percent of all women are likely to become pregnant during their working lives. S.
KAMERMAN, A. KAHN, & P. KINGSTON, MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING WO-
MEN 25 (1983) (the authors present an in-depth study of the shortcomings of maternity
policies in the U.S.).
224. Working women have an average of 2.6 children, requiring an average of three
maternity leaves per working mother. These job interruptions reduce job tenure and
wages in comparison to male coworkers. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appel-
lants, California Fed. Say. & Loan v. Guerra, at 4. Kamerman notes the importance of
maternity policies in today's society. Several factors favor requiring employers to pro-
vide comprehensive pregnancy disability benefits: (1) the growth in the female labor
force from 27% of all wives in 1960 to 56% in 1982, with an even higher rate for single
mothers (67.7% in 1982); (2) women are having fewer children-birthrates for wives in
the 18 to 34 age group fell and lifetime expected births dropped from 3 to 2.2 between
1969 and 1979-making the cost of providing maternity benefits less burdensome;
(3) women contribute more to family income than in the past as working wives contrib-
ute approximately 26% of family income, and women who work full time all year con-
tribute 39%; (4) women are working longer during their pregnancies, even during the
last trimester; (5) women return to work after shorter absences than in the past and the
return rates of mothers with young children has grown significantly since 1977. S.
KAMERMAN, A. KAHN. & P. KINGSTON, supra note 222 at 6-12.
225. See 123 CONG. REC. 29,651-52 (1977). See also S. KAMERMAN, A. KAHN &
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fits extended by state statute,22 7 the medically recommended length of
maternity leave,228 the length of leave time for other disabilities,229 the
expense of childbearing230 and the impact inadequate benefits have on
the woman.23 Each factor augments the proposition that women, who
must overcome physical, emotional, social and financial pressures
stemming from pregnancy, in addition to the comparable nonoccupa-
tional disabilities their male coworkers endure, need additional benefits
to balance the employment opportunity scales.232 With these variables
P. KINGSTON, supra note 222, at 47-76, 99-131. The authors review a detailed study of
the types of maternity policies. First, they found that one-third of all full-time female
employees in the private sector, including almost one-third of those who are not mar-
ried, do not have health insurance. Part-time workers as well as young women are even
more likely to lack coverage. At least 10% of all working women in their child-bearing
years lack coverage. Second, about three-fourths of women working at least 20 hours
per week are eligible for short, child-birth leaves. Finally, under the PDA, some women
working for employers with short-term sickness or disability insurance receive at least
some paid maternity leave; however, the smaller employers provide fewer benefits; usu-
ally, only upon availability of disability insurance is there a paid leave that lasts beyond
a few weeks. Id. at 74-76. The authors summarize this chapter by stating: "Progress
has been made.., but the progress has been highly uneven and far less than many
believe. Any attempts to private sector provisions for maternity must recognize the
pattern of the inequalities. Women in smaller businesses generally are entitled to less
generous treatment .... "
226. Id. at 76. The authors note that some companies, but not all, provide one or
more maternity benefits, which include health insurance, job-protected leave and wage
replacement during leaves. Id. at 74-75. See also 123 CONG. REc. 29,651-52 (1977).
227. See S. KAMERMAN, A. KAHN, & P. KINGSTON, supra note 222, at 75-98. The
authors note that 75 other countries provide special treatment for pregnant employees.
All industrialized countries except the United States require some form of maternity or
parental leave by statute. Id. at 16-22.
228. Congress had evidence that in 95% of all pregnancy cases the average time lost
is six weeks or less. H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 40, at 4753.
229. Congress compared pregnancy to such disabilities as broken bones, vasecto-
mies and hair transplants. See 123 CONG. REC. 29,641, 29,654 (1977).
230. See 123 CONG. REC. 29,387 (Remarks of Sen. Javits). In 1982 the cost of
having a child was about $2,300. In 1982, the average cost of caesarean section was
$3,554. S. KAMERMAN, A. KAHN & P. KINGSTON, supra note 222, at 47-48.
231. The labor force participation rate of mothers with children under one year
increased from 32% to 42% between 1977 and 1982. See S. KAMERMAN, A. KAHN, &
P. KINGSTON, supra note 222, at 121. Congress also had before it evidence of the im-
pact of pregnancy on women with families who were deprived of pregnancy-related
benefits. See 123 CONG. REC. 29,388-89 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
232. Taking into account the inadequacy of some policies, a woman not only has to
deal with the physical and financial cost of the pregnancy, but she also must wrestle
with the impact on her family. Women also must cope with the fact that employers
often pay them less than male coworkers for time they do work. See 123 CONG. REC.
29,387 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits). They must also deal with nongender related
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in mind, equal opportunity appears to be the more realistic goal.
Another problem requiring congressional attention arises when em-
ployers supply no, or inadequate, disability benefits. When employers
provide minimal benefits to all disabled employees for disabilities unre-
lated to gender, the policy applies to men and women equally.233 Nev-
ertheless, the inadequate policy imposes an additional burden on
women employees who are uniquely in need of pregnancy benefits.23 4
An inadequate leave policy places female employees who become preg-
nant at a disadvantage.33 Where the inequality affects one sex exclu-
sively, preferential treatment is necessary to restore equality of
employment opportunity. 236 The PDA does not account for policies
that place females in such disadvantaged positions.
Finally, Congress must consider the constraints that its rigid stan-
dard produces. The PDA places both a floor and a ceiling on the bene-
fits an employer can provide pregnant employees.23 7 The floor aids
those women whose employers provide for other nonoccupational disa-
illnesses, such as heart attacks, strokes and broken bones. Additionally, the median
salary of women is only three-fifths of the median salary of male employees. Id. See
supra note 59.
233. Larson notes:
Suppose the employer generally limits sick leave to one month, but grants four
months' maternity leave. Suppose a male employee contracts hepatitis and is un-
able to work for four months. Should he be heard to complain that he is being
discriminated against on the ground of sex, because the kind of physical disability
he is capable of does not entitle him to as long a leave as pregnant female employ-
ees get? Although this line of argument might seem to have some force, it does not
hold up on close scrutiny. Recall that we began with an inherent physical inequal-
ity affecting employability of one sex exclusively; to offset that inequality and re-
store equality of employment opportunity, it was necessary to afford an unequal
benefit in the form of maternity leave. Equality of employment opportunity having
been thus restored, nothing further is needed to redress the male-female balance.
After all, females would still be subject to the same one-month limit as males for
hepatitis.
A. LARSON, supra note 141, § 38.22, at 8-34.
234. Id.
235. Id. § 38.22, at 8-31 to 8-35.
236. See Note, supra note 141, at 707.
237. The employer may provide neither more nor fewer benefits to pregnant work-
ers. "Women affected by pregnancy ... shall be treated the same for all employment
related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected in their ability or inability to
work." 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (emphasis added). The courts, however, sometimes inter-
pret the Act to remove this rigid standard. See Guerra, 758 F.2d at 395, 396; Miller-
Wohl, 692 P.2d at 125 1. Whether these courts properly interpret the Act and its legisla-
tive history is questionable. Congressional re-education would eliminate any doubt.
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bilities. 238 The ceiling, however, restricts the pregnancy-related bene-
fits to equal the benefits available to all employees.239 This prevents an
employer from making his own business decisions. Despite the value
of female labor to the enterprise, an employer may not provide spe-
cially for pregnancy-related disabilities to appease these workers with-
out providing similar benefits to all.240 Equal treatment could harm an
employer even though he believed it in the best interest of his business
to provide women pregnancy-related benefits.241
In addition, the ceiling prevents states from exercising their police
power. The state that provides pregnancy-related benefits runs the risk
that a court will rule that its efforts are federally preempted.2 42 The
state is estopped from providing reasonable pregnancy benefits even
though the economic makeup of the state calls for such measures or the
people demand these benefits.
In attempting to "clarify' 24 3 the pregnancy discrimination problem,
Congress left questions unanswered and consequences unexamined.
The Act also created additional problems. Unable to pinpoint the con-
gressional goal, courts are rendering inconsistent decisions. Although
not specifically rewriting the PDA, the judicial trend seems to interpret
the second clause of the Act not as "women affected by pregnancy shall
be treated the [very] same as other persons ... similar in their ability to
238. For example, if an employer provides 10 days leave of absence for all nonoccu-
pational disabilities, the pregnant employee is entitled to 10 days leave of absence for the
pregnancy-related disability. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. 1604.10(b) (1985).
239. Once again, the employer can only provide the very "same" benefits for the
pregnancy-related disability. He can provide no more.
240. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k); see also supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
The Ninth Circuit specifically referred to this "floor-ceiling" relationship in Guerra.
See 728 F.2d at 396.
241. There are several factors that could influence the employer. In certain work
environments the disability rate could be greater for women than men depending on the
age of the group in question. The pattern may vary with the place of employment,
locality, geographical region, ethnic background and other factors. See U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
(1985). An employer with a large female labor force may decide it is in his economic
best interest to provide women with pregnancy related benefits to retain good workers.
Some congressmen felt that the decision on pregnancy-related benefits should be left to
mechanisms such as collective bargaining. See 123 CONG. REC. 29,659 (1977) (remarks
of Sen. Helms).
242. See, e.g., Guerra, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 563 (although later reversed, the
District Court held the California law favoring pregnancy-related disabilities null and
void). See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
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work.. .," but rather as "women affected by pregnancy shall be treated
[at least the] same as other persons ... similar in their ability to work
.. "244 These two possible interpretations leave courts, as well as
employees, without true guidance. Therefore, to accomplish the goal
of equality in treatment and opportunity, Congress must reevaluate
and reformulate its solution to pregnancy discrimination.2 45 A more
precise explanation of the pregnancy discrimination policy would cur-
tail the battle between equal treatment and equal opportunity
theorists.24 6
B. Alternatives
Upon reexamination, Congress is likely to rearticulate its goal in
equal opportunity language. 24 7 Consequently, it also must reformulate
the means to reach the end. Because critics have attacked both the
pure preferential treatment and same treatment models, compromise
legislation may furnish a conduit to the equal opportunity goal. There
are two possible compromise solutions,2 4 8 one "permissive" and one
"mandatory."
The first is for Congress to reformulate the PDA, making the same
treatment standard a floor for benefits that employers must provide,
but lifting the ceiling on what they may provide.24 9 Under this ap-
244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981). This reading of the PDA seems to be increas-
ingly popular. Perhaps this is a hint to congressmen that they should act promptly to
implement a pregnancy discrimination policy as outlined in recent cases.
245. See supra notes 214-43 and accompanying text.
246. As previously noted, parties in the pregnancy debate each attempt to interpret
the PDA to support their view. See supra notes 81-85, 141-63 and accompanying text.
Congressional narrowing or clarifying may end this attempt to read into the PDA pur-
poses that the legislators may not have intended. Although congressional redefinition of
the federal pregnancy policy probably will not satisfy all parties involved, Congress at
least can provide a more focused scheme that courts, states and employers can easily
apply to pregnancy policies.
247. See supra notes 141-63 and accompanying text (discussing the equal opportu-
nity theory). Congress should take into consideration the possibility of a remedy for
disparate impact. Some believe the PDA, if interpreted correctly already does this. See
Note, supra note 141. One author believes it is unwise to treat pregnancy like any other
disability, and Congress should therefore follow the lead of states that provide special
treatment for pregnancy. Note, Equality in the Workplace: Is That Enough for Preg-
nant Workers? 23 J. FAM. L. 401, 417-18 (1984-85).
248. These two theories are not suggested as the only possible solutions to the preg-
nancy discrimination dilemma.
249. As previously noted, the Ninth Circuit already has interpreted the PDA as
placing a limit on the minimum benefits states could require employers to provide, not a
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proach, women would retain benefits gained under the 1978 Act,250
and would be eligible for any additional benefits the employer or state
may provide to alleviate disparate impact.25" '
This compromise solution is permissive because employers may le-
gally provide additional benefits to pregnant employees. This proposal
has many strong points. First, women retain the benefits they pres-
ently enjoy. A plan left to the whim of employers or states could rele-
gate pregnancy benefits to their pre-1978 status.2" 2 Second, the
proposal provides a means to distinguish pregnancy from other nonoc-
cupational disabilities and to account for the inherent physical and
mental complications of pregnancy. The state or employer may look to
the disability itself.253
Third, although not guaranteeing equal opportunity, the proposal
gives women a chance to attain equal opportunity. The proposal takes
the decisionmaking power from the strictures of the federal govern-
ment and gives it to those in a better position to evaluate the social and
economic needs of the work force. The state or employer can furnish
benefits in accordance with the composition of the work force, the atti-
tudes of the population and the economic welfare of the business.254
Either of these two groups is in a better position than the federal gov-
ernment to balance the needs of its workers against the economic and
other consequences of special legislation.255 Obviously, some legisla-
cap on the maximum amounts the states could require them to give to pregnant employ-
ees. Guerra, 758 F.2d at 396. See supra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
250. Women would receive at least the same level of benefits for pregnancy-related
disabilities as the employer provides for other disabilities that similarly affect the ability
to work. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (1981).
251. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-310 (1983). The state could provide addi-
tional benefits if called for by popular vote or if the legislators think it necessary under
the state police power. The employer could provide benefits called for in collective
bargaining or decided upon in its own business judgment. There may be equal protec-
tion challenges to this type of action, but the Montana federal district court did not find
an equal protection problem with the MMLA. Although its decision was vacated later
on jurisdictional grounds, the district court upheld the statute against the equal protec-
tion challenge. Miller-Wohl, 515 F. Supp. at 1266.
252. See, e.g., Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
253. See Krieger & Cooney, supra note 10. See also supra notes 141-63 and accom-
panying text.
254. See supra notes 218-28 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. In addition to the advantages
state legislators have by being closer to local employment situations, state courts are




tors found increased benefits best for their citizens.256 Additionally,
because an employer is in a better position than the federal government
to assess his business requirements and to monitor employee needs, he
is better able to negotiate a mutually beneficial disability plan.
If decisionmaking rests with a smaller body more closely associated
with the employees, women have a better chance to advance their posi-
tion because it is easier to influence a smaller group of deci-
sionmakers.25 7 Lower level decisionmakers are also in a better position
to monitor the effects of the disability policy and readjust the plan
should the factors in the balance change.258 Therefore, the proposal
provides a better chance for equal opportunity.
This proposal, however, is not totally flawless. It fails to provide
immediately for those women who presently receive no benefits for
nonoccupational disabilities.259 The proposal, however, does allow
State courts may be in a better position to review local economic legislation than
the Supreme Court. State courts . . . may better adapt their decisions to local
economic conditions and needs .... And where an industry is of basic importance
to the economy of a state or territory, extraordinary regulations may be necessary
and proper.
Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 N.W.
U.L. REV. 226, 250 (1958).
256. To the employer, who will probably distribute the same amount of profits to
employees in salaries or benefits even if he does provide pregnancy benefits, the alloca-
tion of costs may not matter. Therefore, men have an incentive to push for greater
benefits because of the Supreme Court's Newport News decision that employers must
provide the same level of benefits to employees of both sexes in policies that extend to
the employees' spouses. See 462 U.S. 669. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying
text. Men, realizing that they may gain medical coverage for their spouses, may be
more willing to negotiate for pregnancy benefits. See Kirby & Robyn, Pregnancy, Jus-
tice and the Justices, 57 TEX. L. REV. 947 (1979).
257. The organization and expense of a campaign for pregnancy-benefits is a much
easier task if the forum is closer and more accessible to the proponents.
258. If the makeup of the workforce changes within a business, or economic condi-
tions make it unreasonable to continue benefits, the employer could lower them to a
level equal to other disability benefits. Likewise, if results are favorable, he could raise
them.
259. See supra notes 141-63 and accompanying text. The employers or local gov-
ernments may be too close to the situation and know too well the economic advantages
of discrimination against pregnant workers. They may determine that their minimum
level of benefits, to which they compare benefits for all workers, is zero. This determi-
nation would not help any of the workers. Despite this limitation, unlike the strict
reading of the PDA's sameness language, the proposal recommended herein provides a
framework through which employers may account for the immutable sexual difference
between men and women that makes the difference in a woman's struggle for equal
opportunity.
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states or employers to fill this gap without threat of preemption.2 60
Furthermore, the plan does not answer all of the questions posed by
the equal treatment advocates who find special legislation danger-
ous.2 6' The proposal also hinders uniformity, because various states
and employers are free to develop individualized plans that they deem
best for their female workers.
262
The "permissive" model has additional problems. Given an equal
opportunity goal, legislation that merely permits preferential treatment
is inadequate when employers choose to omit all temporary disability
benefits from employment programs.26 3 Studies show that, even under
the PDA, approximately one-half of the female labor force lacks ade-
quate income and job protection at the time of childbirth.2 1 Conse-
quently, leaving pregnancy benefit policies to the employer's discretion
may leave many women with nothing.
The second proposal addresses the shortcomings suffered by the per-
missive model. To alleviate the inequities that a permissive pregnancy
discrimination statute could create,2 65 Congress should reformulate
pregnancy legislation to require employers to implement policies that
provide reasonable pregnancy disability benefits.266 To avoid charges
of protectionism, Congress should require employers to provide the
same level of benefits to all employees that it affords pregnant work-
ers.267 Such mandatory legislation would embrace both the equal op-
260. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 258-61 and accompanying text (shortcomings of the first pro-
posed solution).
264. See S. KAMERMAN, A. KAHN & P. KINGSTON, supra note 222, at 141. The
authors summarize results of the Columbia University study presented in the book. Id.
at 38. They conclude that the United States does not have an adequate maternity pol-
icy. Id. at 147.
265. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (pitfalls of permissive pregnancy
discrimination legislation).
266. This proposal does not leave the decision to the state. This may engender a
debate as to within whose realm of authority the pregnancy discrimination question
falls. See infra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
267. Others have proposed nation-wide disability legislation. They argue that no
women should lose their jobs because they are pregnant, but neither should they face
horrors of protectionist legislation. See N.Y. Times, July 22, 1984 at F23 (quoting Isa-
belle Katz Pinzler, a woman's rights attorney at ACLU). Consequently, these commen-
tators argue that the solution is temporary disability leave for all workers. Id. The
Montana Supreme Court, in Miller- Wohl, agreed with ACLU, NOW and the League of
Women Voters that the maternity benefits provided by a Montana statute should be
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portunity theory of accommodating the peculiarities of pregnancy and
the equal treatment theory of sameness in application.
There is merit to this "mandatory" proposal. First, all employers
must provide reasonable pregnancy disability benefits, thereby assuring
pregnant workers of some benefits and an increased chance for equal
opportunity in the workplace. Second, this model furthers the goal of
equality in effect, because all workers receive the same level of tempo-
rary disability benefits.2 68 This decreases the worker hostility that a
preferential treatment plan might engender.2 69 Third, the flexibility of
this proposal allows an employer to decide the specifics of the policy;
he can thus account for the peculiarities of pregnancy, composition of
his workforce and extent of his finances. Consequently, the person
closest to the economic situation of a specific business formulates a
workable policy, within the statutory boundaries, and applies it accord-
ingly.27 ° Fourth, the "mandatory" proposal does not restrict the level
of benefits. Like the "permissive" proposal, it does not directly cap the
level that employers may provide for pregnancy disabilities.27 1
This proposal, however, is also not flawless.2 72 First, the proposal
embodies a reasonableness standard. The question of what is reason-
able is inevitably raised. Consequently, the question of who initially
extended to all workers. 642 P.2d at 1253-55. The Montana Supreme Court agreed
with the suggestion that the employer could comply with both the preferential treat-
ment standard and the PDA by amending its disability policy to allow reasonable leaves
of absence, required by the Montana law, to any first-year employee who misses work
due to disability. The court, however, left the decision to the state legislature. Id. at
1255. See also Miller-Wohl, 515 F. Supp. at 1267 (the federal district court made the
same suggestion).
268. This proposal in effect forces employers to provide disability benefits for all
temporary disabilities because requiring employers to apply the same level of benefits
across the board covers disabilities not previously included in any disability plan.
269. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (enumeration of problems equal
treatment theorists claim preferential treatment engenders).
270. The reasonableness standard is preferable to a fixed standard which forces all
employers who are not in the same businesses or financial positions to comply with a
particular requirement. A fixed standard may not cause problems for policies such as
assuring temporarily disabled employees the same or similar job upon return to work,
but regulations providing a fixed stipend for time away from the job may unduly burden
some employers if the stipend is high. See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
271. One effect of the proposal, however, may be to keep disability policies at the
lower end of the scale, yet within the bounds of reasonableness, because employers will
have to cover all temporary disabilities according to the benefit provided pregnant
employees.
272. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (flaws of permissive legislation).
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determines what is reasonable-Congress, an administrative agency,
the state or the employer-is also raised.273 A possible answer to the
question is that the EEOC could formulate limits on various aspects of
maternity policies, leaving room for employer discretion.274 Second,
critics may question the use of pregnancy as a yardstick. Measuring all
disability benefits by those levied to afford pregnant workers equal op-
portunity may not be practical when applied to workers temporarily
disabled by various other illnesses.275 Finally, the "mandatory" model
eliminates the middleman-the state government. The power to regu-
late maternity policies as a means of protecting the health and welfare
of its citizens may well be considered a power traditionally left to the
states. If so, any attempt at mandatory federal regulation could be sub-
ject to attack under the tenth amendment.27 6 Judicial approval of state
maternity legislation verifies the claim that pregnancy discrimination is
an area in which states may properly legislate.277 The preemption
question would loom over this proposal, much as it does the PDA,
unless Congress specifically prohibits or endorses state legislation in
this area.278
273. The judiciary will figure prominently into the process. Regardless of who ini-
tially decides the criteria defining the boundaries of reasonableness, the court will prob-
ably review that decision.
274. The EEOC could address the problem much as it did the sameness standard of
the PDA. See 29 C.F.R. 1604.10 (1985). This would provide upper and lower bounda-
ries, and give employers and courts a guide to proper pregnancy policies.
275. A rigid set of rules may cause greater problems than the discretionary method
with a reasonableness standard. For example, California requires four months of preg-
nancy disability leave. See supra note 105. This standard, applied across the board,
may endanger production if all temporarily disabled employers receive four months
leave. Under a reasonableness standard employers can look at their workforce in light
of the reasonableness standard and formulate policies to accommodate pregnant work-
ers while still protecting themselves. A black-letter rule has advantages in that it de-
creases argument over congressional intent because no one would have discretion to
deviate from the imposed requirements. Also, each employer would have a specific
guide, freeing him from decisionmaking. The problems a black-letter rule could create,
as noted above, override the benefits it supplies. Therefore, a flexible standard accom-
modating employer and employee seems preferable.
276. U.S. CON T. amend X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." See supra notes 152-55, 241 and accompanying text (regarding federal
preemption of state statutes).
277. See supra notes 190-208 and accompanying text (judicial approval of Montana
and California maternity policies).




These proposals are laudable in some respects, but flawed in others.
They are not definitive answers to pregnancy discrimination problems.
They do, however, eliminate weaknesses in the present legislation and
suggest possible alternative solutions.
V. CONCLUSION
One can determine from the split of authority examined herein that
the PDA does not solve, or even address, all pregnancy discrimination
problems. Congress must re-evaluate the law, using all available infor-
mation, to rearticulate the goal and reformulate the means to attain
that goal. Congress must respond to the difficulties that courts, em-
ployers and workers encounter under the present form of the PDA. To
end much of the confusion, Congress must thoroughly re-examine the
evidence, consequences and alternatives concerning pregnancy discrim-
ination. As a result, they may attain the "common sense" resolution to
pregnancy discrimination they sought in 1978.279
279. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1985).
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